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Abstract
Corporatism has been one of the most heavily studied concepts in comparative po-
litical economy over the past two decades, and quantitative indicators of corpora-
tism have played a central role in the corporatist literature. This paper offers a sur-
vey and assessment of 42 such indicators. The principal aims are to provide an in-
ventory of existing indicators, to examine their relative trustworthiness and utility,
and to assess the robustness of empirical findings on the effects of corporatism on
macroeconomic performance and income distribution and redistribution. Among the
more noteworthy conclusions I reach are the following: (1) While quantitative corpo-
ratism measures have improved substantially in recent years, substantial gaps re-
main. (2) There is little justification for continued use of time-invariant measures.
(3) Composite corporatism measures are commonplace, yet their creators and users
have yet to offer a compelling explication of how corporatist effects are generated in
such a way that they are more accurately captured by aggregated indicators than by
narrowly-targeted ones. (4) There is fairly strong indication that one or more aspects/
types of corporatism were associated with nominal wage restraint, low inflation, low
unemployment, and low income inequality during the 1970s and 1980s. However,
the results vary markedly depending upon the particular indicator used, and there is
little evidence to support the common presumption that corporatism’s unemploy-
ment-reducing effect occurs via real wage restraint.
Zusammenfassung
Wenige Modelle der vergleichenden politischen Ökonomie sind über die vergange-
nen 20 Jahre so eingehend untersucht worden wie das des Korporatismus. In der
einschlägigen Literatur spielen dabei quantitative Indikatoren eine zentrale Rolle.
Für das vorliegende Discussion Paper sind 42 Indikatoren erhoben und untersucht
worden. Ziel war es, sie auf ihre Brauchbarkeit und Verläßlichkeit hin zu überprüfen
sowie herauszufinden, wie standfest empirische Untersuchungen über die Auswir-
kungen des Korporatismus auf makro-ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit, Einkom-
mensverteilung und -umverteilung sind. Zu den besonders erwähnenswerten Schluß-
folgerungen dieses Discussion Papers gehören: (1) Trotz immer noch bestehender
Mängel haben sich quantitative Koporatismusmaße in den letzten Jahren als stich-
haltig erwiesen. (2) Die Anwendung konstanter Variablen ist nicht mehr sinnvoll.
(3) Summarische Korporatismusindikatoren werden zwar oft verwendet, doch ihre
Erfinder und Anwender bleiben eine einleuchtende Erklärung schuldig, warum kor-
poratistische Effekte besser durch aggregierte Gesamtmaße als durch sachlich ge-
nauere Einzelindikatoren erklärt werden sollten. (4) Alles weist darauf hin, daß eini-
ge Aspekte oder Formen des Korporatismus mit Lohnzurückhaltung, niedriger In-
flation, höherer Beschäftigung und weitgehender Einkommensgleichheit in den 70er
und 80er Jahren korrelieren. Die Ergebnisse variieren jedoch stark, je nachdem, wel-
cher Indikator zugrunde gelegt wurde, und wenig stützt die allgemeine Vermutung,
daß der Korporatismus vor allem durch Lohnzurückhaltung die Arbeitslosigkeit
mindert.
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1 Introduction
After being “almost universally regarded as defunct” (Ferner and Hyman 1998:
xii) in the early 1990s, corporatism is back in the limelight. Despite its genuine if
sometimes overstated decline in perhaps its most celebrated national context,
Sweden, corporatism’s prominence and stature have rebounded considerably in
recent years. Corporatist pacts dealing with issues such as wage growth and em-
ployment have played a key role in two countries commonly viewed as European
economic success stories over the past decade – the Netherlands and Ireland.
Similar pacts have been forged or renewed in Norway, Finland, Belgium, and It-
aly, while less explicit variants of corporatism continue largely unabated in na-
tions such as Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. Not surprisingly, these devel-
opments have rejuvenated academic interest in the topic (e.g., Hassel and Ebbing-
haus 2000; Pochet and Fajertag 1997; Regini 2000; Visser and Hemerijck 1997).
Quantitative measures of corporatism have played a central role in the corporatist
literature since the early 1980s. There have been several dozen attempts to score
or rank the 18 or so most affluent OECD countries on a corporatism scale, in-
cluding a number of composite indexes which aggregate other scorings. This pa-
per offers a survey and assessment of 42 quantitative corporatism indicators.
The paper has several aims. One is simply to provide an inventory of existing in-
dicators, which have grown so numerous as to perhaps overwhelm even sea-
soned researchers in the field. Section 2 of the paper provides an overview of the
42 indicators, and each is described in detail in Appendix A. The coverage here is
not fully exhaustive. I have, however, attempted to include what in my view are
the most prominent and/or useful indicators in the literature. I make no attempt
to add to the already long list of definitions of corporatism. Doing so seems fruit-
less – the literature is now far too varied, as two examples (picked somewhat at
random) from recent studies will attest. One, by Franz Traxler (1999: 56), is quite
brief: “Corporatism means that the state shares its public-order function with or-
ganized business and labor.” The other, by Alan Siaroff (1999: 177–179) in the
same journal and year, is so lengthy it cannot be reprinted here; it includes 22
elements, ranging from labor and business centralization to low industrial con-
flict to state activism to political consensus. Instead of offering a new definition of
corporatism or selecting my preferred existing one, I consider quantitative indi-
cators of anything that is explicitly or implicitly referred to by its creator or users
as corporatism. All of the indicators I examine are available in a Microsoft Excel
file, which can be downloaded from the web page of the Max Planck Institute for
the Study of Societies (Cologne, Germany) at http:/ /www. mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de
or from my homepage at http:/ /www.emory.edu/SOC/lkenworthy.
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The second aim is to examine the trustworthiness and utility of the various in-
dictors. There has been considerable development in this field in recent years,
with an array of new measures appearing. But are the newer indicators superior
to earlier ones? If so, in what ways? And are some of the newer indicators prefer-
able to others? In section 3 I discuss some characteristics useful indicators of cor-
poratism should have and examine the degree to which existing measures have
those characteristics. In section 4 I explore the correlations between the various
indicators.
The third aim is to test the robustness of findings in this field. Like their counter-
parts in many other areas, students of corporatism have not always paid suffi-
cient attention to the impact of indicator choice on empirical results. In section 5
of the paper I assess the relative utility of the indicators in accounting for cross-
country differences in macroeconomic performance in the 1970s and 1980s. In
section 6 I do the same for income distribution and redistribution.
2 An Overview of Existing Indicators
Developments in the quantification of corporatism have been shaped by devel-
opments in the corporatist literature’s analytical focus. Early studies, from the
mid-1970s to the early 1980s, were conducted primarily by scholars who were (at
that time) interested in corporatism per se. Later studies, those since the mid-
1980s or so, have tended to be by scholars interested specifically in corporatism’s
economic (and sometimes political) performance effects. This shift in emphasis
generated a shift from general definitions of corporatism to a focus on income
policies and wage setting. The most notable early quantitative measures of corpo-
ratism were those of Schmitter (1981) and Lehmbruch (1984), which focused on,
respectively, the organization of interest groups and the participation of such
groups in policy making. Measures developed beginning in the mid-1980s by,
e.g., Cameron (1984), Bruno and Sachs (1985), and Calmfors and Driffill (1988)
turned the focus toward centralization and concentration of unions and wage
setting. Within the focus on wage setting, Soskice (1990) then instigated some-
thing of a turn toward measures of wage coordination.
Existing indicators of corporatism can be grouped into four categories according
to their main focus: (1) interest group organization; (2) wage setting arrange-
ments; (3) interest group participation in policy making; (4) political-economic
consensus. A fifth category consists of composite (i.e., aggregated) measures. This
section offers an overview of existing indicators in each of these categories.
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2.1 Interest Group Organization
Philippe Schmitter, who instigated the modern renaissance of interest in corpora-
tism in the mid-1970s (Schmitter 1974), conceptualized corporatism as a mode of
interest group organization (“interest intermediation”). There are two chief di-
mensions to such organization: centralization and concentration. And there are
two principal interest groups of concern: labor and business.
Union centralization refers to the authority that union confederations have over
their members. This authority may vary, of course, depending on the issue or
arena. There are two existing indicators of union centralization: one by David
Cameron (1984) and the other by Schmitter (1981). Both are subjective, time-
invariant measures. To these I here add a third indicator, utilizing data from the
“Union Centralization among Advanced Industrial Societies” data set assembled
by Miriam Golden, Michael Wallerstein, and Peter Lange (1997, henceforth
“GWL”). This new measure is based on objective, time-varying information on
the powers and capacities of the main union confederation in each country – spe-
cifically, whether or not the confederation has power to appoint affiliates, to veto
wage agreements by affiliates, to veto strikes, and whether or not it has its own
strike funds.
Union concentration, which is sometimes referred to as associational monopoly,
has two elements: across confederations and within confederations. The former
refers to the extent to which union members belong to a single confederation
rather than being divided among multiple confederations. The latter refers to the
extent to which the membership of union confederations is concentrated within a
small number of affiliates rather than being spread out across a large number of
affiliates. Schmitter (1981) and Cameron (1984) each provided subjective, time-
invariant measures of overall union concentration in the early 1980s. More re-
cently, objective, time-varying data for each of these two facets of concentration
have been assembled by Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997).
A third dimension of labor organization is union density – the share of employees
who are union members. Because this is never treated by itself as a measure of
corporatism, I do not include it among the indicators examined here. It is, how-
ever, sometimes used in composite corporatism indicators, so I include it in the
data set (see Appendix B).
To my knowledge there is only one existing quantitative measure of business cen-
tralization or concentration, by Hicks and Kenworthy (1998). It is a subjective, time-
varying measure of business organization, combining the degree of concentration
among business confederations and the degree of centralized authority of confed-
erations over their members. To this I here add a second measure, constructed
8 MPIfG Discussion Paper 00/4
from several variables in the GWL data set. It is an indicator of employer centrali-
zation based on objective, time-varying data on the existence of a peak employer
confederation and the powers and capacities of the confederation. The latter in-
clude the power of appointment of affiliates, veto over wage agreements, veto
over lockouts, and having its own conflict funds.1
2.2 Wage Setting/Bargaining Arrangements
Wage setting or bargaining arrangements have always been prominent in the
corporatism literature, as wage formation is one of the areas in which organized
interest groups have been most extensively and regularly involved in decision
making. Initially some researchers used union centralization and/or concentra-
tion as a proxy for wage arrangements, but many soon turned to creation and use
of indicators of the structure of wage bargaining itself. Such indicators focus on
either the centralization or the coordination of the wage formation process. All
are (at least partly) subjective.
Cameron (1984) and Calmfors and Driffill (1988) each offered time-invariant
measures of the degree of wage bargaining centralization. Cameron’s measure is
an index ranging from 0 to 1, paralleling his measures of union centralization and
concentration; Calmfors and Driffill’s is a rank-ordering. More recently an OECD
(1997) study offered a wage centralization index ranging from 1 to 3, measured in
the years 1980, 1990, and 1994. The GWL data set includes three time-varying
measures: (1) an index of union confederation involvement in wage bargaining;
(2) an index of government involvement in wage setting; (3) a summary index of
the degree of wage setting centralization. Since centralization can result from ei-
ther bargaining between union and employer confederations or from government
involvement (participation in bargaining, imposition of a wage schedule or
freeze, mediation, arbitration), or both, the first two of these three indicators are
combined to yield the third. Among the various wage centralization indicators,
the GWL summary centralization index is the only one that explicitly measures
the centralization of wage setting by taking into account situations in which there
is government-imposed centralization; others are measures of the centralization
of wage bargaining. (For ease of explication, however, I use the terms setting and
bargaining more or less interchangeably in later sections of this paper.) Torben
Iversen (1998) has created a time-varying measure that incorporates both the level
of bargaining and the share of workers covered at each bargaining level. The
GWL and Iversen indicators take into account whether or not wage agreements
                                                  
1 After creating this measure I discovered that a similar one has been created by Duane
Swank and Cathie Jo Martin (2000).
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reached at central or industry levels include sanctions, such as a peace obligation
(which prohibits strikes), which limit the ability of lower-level bargainers to cir-
cumvent the agreement. Thus, for instance, the GWL summary centralization in-
dex has four categories: 1 = plant-level wage setting; 2 = industry-level wage set-
ting; 3 = centralized wage setting without sanctions; 4 = centralized wage setting
with sanctions. Franz Traxler and Bernhard Kittel (2000) instead create two dis-
tinct measures, separating the formal bargaining level from the existence of sanc-
tions. One is an index of the degree of wage bargaining centralization that does
not take sanctions into account. The other is a dichotomous measure of “bar-
gaining governability,” which refers to the presence or absence of such sanctions.
In an influential 1990 article, David Soskice (1990) argued that the focus of those
interested in effects of wage setting/bargaining should be on coordination rather
than centralization. Centralization is only one means, albeit an important one, of
achieving wage coordination. Others include guidance of industry bargaining by
a powerful, monopolistic union confederation (as in Austria), a high degree of
union concentration plus extensive pattern-setting (as in Germany), and coordi-
nation by employer federations with limited union influence (as in Japan and
Switzerland). Coordination was the focus of Crouch’s (1985) earlier dichotomous
indicator of wage bargaining arrangements, though he did not make explicit the
points emphasized by Soskice. Soskice himself offered coordination scores, but
for only 11 countries. The Soskice scores have been updated and extended to a
larger set of countries by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991; Layard and Nickell
1994; Nickell 1997) and by Hall and Franzese (1998). There are three time-varying
indicators of wage coordination. One is an OECD measure, which is available
only for 1980, 1990, and 1994. The second is my own (Kenworthy 2000), which is a
revised and updated version of an earlier measure used in Hicks and Kenworthy
(1998). These scores draw heavily on the GWL summary index of wage setting
centralization for countries in which coordination is achieved primarily via cen-
tralization and on Soskice’s logic for nations in which it is achieved in other ways.
The third time-varying indicator is a categorical measure by Traxler and Kittel
(2000), which identifies the type of wage coordination in each country without
attempting to create a rank-ordering or scale.
Also relevant to wage arrangements is the share of the workforce that is covered
by collective bargaining agreements. In some nations this figure is essentially the
same as the share that belong to unions, but in others extension laws or practices
make the coverage rate much higher than the unionization rate (Traxler 1996).
Like union density, the coverage rate is never treated as an indicator of corpora-
tism per se, but since it is very closely related I include it in the data set (see Ap-
pendix B).
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2.3 Interest Group Participation in Policy Making
Although much of the focus in the corporatism literature has been on wage bar-
gaining, many scholars have conceived of corporatism as participation by organ-
ized interest groups in various types of public policy making.2 Surprisingly,
however, to my knowledge only two attempts have been made to quantify this
broader conception. Both focus on participation by one of the major interest
groups, labor, in one type of policy arena, economic policy. Both are subjective.
The first indicator is Gerhard Lehmbruch’s (1984) time-invariant measure of un-
ion participation in economic policy making, which includes but is not limited to
wage setting. This follows from Lehmbruch’s focus on policy concertation as the
core of corporatism. The other is Hugh Compston’s time-varying measure of un-
ion participation in economic policy making exclusive of wage setting. Compston
excludes wage setting arrangements “because these represent government par-
ticipation in union policy making rather than union participation in government
policy making” (736).
Unfortunately, there is no existing indicator of business participation in policy
making. The issue here is of course participation by organized business – i.e., em-
ployer confederations – rather than by individual firms.
2.4 Political-Economic Consensus
Some analysts consider political and/or economic consensus to be a key compo-
nent of corporatism (e.g., Katzenstein 1985; Keman 1984; Schmidt 1982). This is
obviously a tricky concept to operationalize. Although several composite indica-
tors include consensus as an element, I am aware of only two indicators that fo-
cus on consensus alone: a dichotomous measure by McCallum (1983, 1986) and a
three-category index by Paloheimo (1984). Both are time-invariant, and both rely
heavily on strike rates.
2.5 Composite Measures
I include 13 composite measures here: from Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange (1991),
Bruno and Sachs (1985), Cameron (1984), Hicks and Kenworthy (1998), Hicks and
                                                  
2 In Schmitter’s (1982: 262–263) early conceptualization, this was “corporatism 2” or
“concertation,” with “corporatism 1” referring to interest group organization.
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Swank (1992), Keman (1984), Lehner (1988), Lijphart and Crepaz (1991), Schmidt
(1982), Schmitter (1981), Swank (2000), Tarantelli (1986), and Western (1997).
There are others, but these 13 seem to be a reasonably representative sample.
Some are relatively narrow. Those of Cameron and Schmitter, for instance, are es-
sentially just aggregations of their union centralization and concentration meas-
ures. Others, such as those of Bruno and Sachs, Hicks and Swank, and Schmidt,
combine four or more elements. The Lijphart-Crepaz measure is an unabashedly
atheoretical aggregation of a dozen previous measures.
3 What Characteristics Should Quantitative Indicators
of Corporatism Have?
I suggest in this section that an ideal corporatism indicator would be: (1) based on
careful scrutiny of extensive data, though in most instances relying in part on
subjective judgment; (2) scored for all of the 18 countries commonly used in
quantitative comparative research; (3) time-varying, with annual measurement;
(4) scored for the years 1960 up to the very recent past; (5) a scale measure rather
than a rank ordering; (6) narrowly-targeted rather than an aggregation of various
elements. Only one of the 42 indicators meets all of these criteria, and very few
meet most of them.
3.1 Subjective vs. Objective
Objective measures of political-economic institutions are almost always prefer-
able, but they are frequently impossible to create. Government partisanship can
be measured in a relatively objective fashion – as, e.g., the share of cabinet seats
held by parties of the left (though definitions of “left” can certainly differ). But
creating quantitative indicators for many other institutions, such as state struc-
ture or central bank independence, tends to require judgment. The same is true
for most indicators of corporatism. The GWL measures of union concentration are
one exception, and they represent a clear improvement over earlier subjective
measures. But in scoring wage coordination or centralization, union participation
in policy making, or consensus, an element of subjectivity is unavoidable. The
two indicators of consensus partially escape subjectivity because they are based
largely on strike frequency data. Yet judgment nonetheless enters in the decision
about where to draw the lines between high and low categories. Moreover, by
measuring consensus using what is presumably an effect of it, low strike fre-
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quency, this type of measure loses some conceptual utility. (It is also worth not-
ing that strike data are somewhat problematic due to distortions and context-
dependent measurement problems; see Shalev 1978.)
Although virtually all corporatism indicators are subjective, they are not all
equally valid. There is a substantial difference between scorings that are (by
choice or necessity) somewhat impressionistic and those based on a wealth of
detailed and reliable information. In this respect, recently developed indicators
are likely to be superior to earlier ones. Information about interest group organi-
zation, wage setting arrangements, and participation by unions in policy making
is much more extensive and readily available today than was the case a decade or
two ago. Thus, the wage centralization indicators of GWL, Iversen, and Traxler-
Kittel are almost certainly more accurate than those of Cameron or Calmfors-
Driffill. The same is true of Compston’s scores for union participation in eco-
nomic policy making as compared to Lehmbruch’s.
3.2 Coverage of Countries
There are 19 countries that have a population of at least 3 million, have a level of
per capita GDP at least half that of the United States, and have been continuously
democratic throughout the post-World War II period. One of these, Israel, is not a
member of the OECD and thus lacks comparable data for many of the variables of
interest in quantitative analysis. The other 18 comprise the nations commonly
used in quantitative analyses involving corporatism: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
Unfortunately, many of the existing indicators – 27 of the 42 assessed here – do
not cover the full set of 18 countries. Ireland is the most frequently missing na-
tion, followed by New Zealand. There are, of course, widely differing views
about the scores some of these countries should be assigned on various subjective
corporatism measures. But there is seldom a persuasive rationale for a priori ex-
clusion of a country from the scoring. Lack of adequate data is certainly one rea-
sonable justification, but that does not appear to have been the cause in most in-
stances.
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3.3 Constant vs. Time-Varying
It has frequently been argued by creators or users of quantitative corporatism in-
dicators that corporatism, like many other institutions, is “sticky” over time and
is thus appropriately treated as constant. For example, in an earlier article in
which I used Cameron’s index of union concentration to predict cross-country
variation in inflation, I wrote (Kenworthy 1996: 505–506):
Analyses of the relationship between labor organization and economic perform-
ance typically assume that the former is constant over time. Recent research sug-
gests that this is a reasonable assumption. There has indeed been relatively little
change in labor movement concentration in these 15 nations during the past sev-
eral decades. Change has occurred in some countries, but developments have off-
set one another so that the overall degree of concentration has not shifted. In
Sweden and the other Nordic nations, for instance, the share of union members
accounted for by the largest confederation has declined in the 1980s; at the same
time, the number of affiliates to the major confederations has decreased. I there-
fore follow the pattern in the literature of using a uniform labor organization in-
dex across the various time periods.
This was not an unreasonable argument to make, because the GWL data (which
were not available at the time that article was written) suggest that union con-
centration has indeed been fairly stable over time in many countries. Yet it has
not been completely stable. And some other key elements (or types) of corpora-
tism, such as wage setting arrangements and union participation in policy mak-
ing, have changed quite a bit over time in some countries.
Relatively few of the existing indicators of corporatism vary over time; only 18 of
the 42 indicators assessed here do. There is no time-varying measure of consensus
and only two such composite measures.3 Of the 18 time-varying indicators, 14 are
measured annually.
Given the availability of time-varying corporatism indicators, there is no longer
much justification for creating or using measures that do not incorporate change
over time. Several studies have found that the effects of corporatism appear to
vary across different periods (e.g., Crepaz 1992; Kenworthy 1996; Kittel 1999). But
if a time-invariant indicator of corporatism is used, it is impossible to know
whether such a finding owes to changes in corporatist effects or rather to (un-
measured) changes in the degree of corporatism itself.
Time-invariant indicators are also suspect in terms of trustworthiness, as they are
less likely than time-varying measures to be based on careful attention to fine
                                                  
3 A third time-varying composite measure has recently been created by Pennings and
Vergunst (2000). However, I do not have access to these data.
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details of institutional arrangements such as corporatism. Such attention is neces-
sary in the creation of time-varying scores, in order to know whether a change
has occurred from one year to the next. Time-invariant indicators are more likely
to be based on an overall “feel.” Indeed, many time-invariant indicators appear to
have been created as such precisely because lack of information rendered the as-
signment of scores for each individual year impossible. This is not inherently the
case; it is certainly possible for time-varying scores to be based as much or even
more on feel or speculation as time-invariant ones. But all else being equal, it
seems reasonable to presume the superiority of those that vary over time in this
respect.
3.4 Coverage of Years
If the effects of corporatism do change over time, and if researchers are to have
some hope that their analyses may impact policy, it is vital that we be able to ex-
amine the very recent past. Unfortunately, at the time of this writing (July 2000),
the most recent year for which any of the existing corporatist indicators is avail-
able is 1994. The lone exception to this is the Kenworthy measure of wage setting
coordination, which goes through 1999. However, several improvements are on
the horizon. Michael Wallerstein is planning to update the data for some of the
GWL measures, and those data will be publicly available as soon as the update is
completed. Also, although the Traxler-Kittel data on wage centralization and co-
ordination only go up to 1990, the project from which those data are drawn – the
Project on “Internationalization, Labor Relations, and Competitiveness,” directed
by Franz Traxler (henceforth “ILC”) – has data for these and other related indi-
cators through 1996. The full ILC data set will be made available for public use
sometime after the publication of a book based on the data (Traxler, Blaschke, and
Kittel forthcoming).
It is also worth noting that several of the time-varying corporatism indicators –
those of Iversen, Traxler-Kittel, and Compston – begin only in the early 1970s.
Given that OECD data for most measures of economic structure and performance
begin in 1960, this limits analysis somewhat.
3.5 Level of Measurement
A number of corporatism indicators during the initial wave of quantification in
the early 1980s were rank orderings, while more recent indicators have typically
been scale measures. When treated as scale variables, as they frequently are in
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statistical analyses, rank orderings have the potential disadvantage of artificially
inflating the degree of variation between countries on the high and low ends.
However, this is not generally a problem for corporatism studies, in which the
interest is typically in the existence and direction of effect rather than its precise
magnitude. More problematic for rankings is that they are difficult to keep con-
sistent for a measure that varies over time. In this respect scale measures are
clearly preferable.
There has been a strong preference in the literature for indicators that treat varia-
tions in corporatism as differences of degree rather than of type. Thus, all but four
of the indicators included here are either scale or rank-ordered measures. Three
of the four exceptions are dichotomous and therefore can be treated as scale
measures with only two levels. The fourth is Traxler and Kittel’s measure of wage
coordination. This is a categorical (i.e., nominal) measure with six categories: in-
ter-associational coordination, intra-associational coordination, pattern-setting,
state-imposed coordination, state-sponsored coordination, and no coordination. It
is useful to separate these alternative sources of wage coordination, and Traxler
and Kittel provide scores for the modal value for each country in each year cov-
ered by the data. Yet they go further to offer a provocative argument that calls
into question much of the past decade’s research on the effects of wage coordina-
tion: “If there are qualitatively differing coordination forms, any attempt to con-
struct an ordinal scale of bargaining coordination becomes pointless.” This does
not strike me as compelling, any more than it would to suggest that because there
are different religions it is pointless to construct an ordinal or scale measure of
religiosity. It is certainly not immediately obvious whether, for example, pattern-
setting led by IG Metall in Germany amounts to more or less coordination than
does centralized wage setting without a peace obligation in Finland. But to the
extent that wage coordination is suspected to have real economic effects, it seems
worth the effort to try to make such judgments, as Soskice (1990), Layard, Nickell,
and Jackman (1991), the OECD (1997), Hall and Franzese (1998), and Kenworthy
(2000) have done.
3.6 Composite vs. Narrow Measures
Composite indicators of corporatism are widely used in quantitative research. I
examine 13 such measures here. Elements that have been aggregated to form
these composite measures include, among others, union centralization, union
concentration, union density, employer centralization, shop-floor autonomy, the
presence of works councils, frequency of strikes, union participation in policy
making, left party political strength, societal consensus, and commitment to a
partnership ideology. Sometimes these measures are summed or averaged, some-
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times they are combined using different weights, and in other instances the com-
posite measure is based on the results of factor analysis.
There is an obvious logic to such aggregation. Most theoretical discussions and
qualitative analyses of corporatism treat it as a multidimensional concept. In at-
tempting to quantify corporatism while remaining true to the theoretical and
qualitative literatures, it is therefore tempting to aggregate. The temptation is ac-
centuated by the fact that the small number of cases – 18 or fewer – used in the
typical cross-sectional regression analysis of corporatist effects allows for inclu-
sion of very few independent variables. Furthermore, a number of the elements
that tend to be combined are highly correlated with one another: countries with
centralized unions tend to have centralized employers, strong left parties, low
strike rates, and so on.
Yet the use of composite measures in quantitative analysis may hide more than it
reveals. As Robert Flanagan (1999: 1167–1168) has noted: “The focus on a single
aggregated measure may obscure the exact effect of common institutional factors
producing the correlation and at the same time may suggest an influence on eco-
nomic outcomes for some elements of the index that have no influence at all.”
Narrowly-targeted measures may therefore be preferable. Consider, for instance,
the well-trod question of whether or not corporatism yields lower unemploy-
ment. There are at least three channels through which a straightforward effect
(i.e., ignoring nonlinearities and interactions with other institutions such as gov-
ernment partisanship or central bank independence) of this type might occur:
1. Corporatism generates wage restraint, which yields lower unemployment;
2. Corporatism generates government commitment to low unemployment, and
the resulting policy efforts are at least somewhat successful in achieving it;
3. Corporatism leads to less rent seeking, which yields a healthier overall eco-
nomic climate, including lower unemployment.
A composite measure is unable to distinguish between these three channels, and
may in fact be conceptually inappropriate for examining any of them. Instead, the
first channel should be examined with an indicator of wage setting arrangements,
the second with an indicator of union participation in economic policy making,
and the third with indicators of labor and/or business organization.
Methodological constraints no longer necessitate the use of composite measures,
if they ever did. The recent development of time-varying corporatism measures
enables use of pooled cross-section time-series regression, which substantially in-
creases the number of observations and thereby alleviates the need for hyper-
parsimony in the choice of explanatory variables. Because pooled regressions es-
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timate coefficients that are constant across years or periods, they may ignore
changes in effects over time (Kittel 1999). But this can be remedied by judicious
use of interaction terms or analysis of individual years or periods.
Where corporatism serves merely as a control variable in analyses that focus on
other aspects of the political economy, there seems little harm in utilizing a com-
posite measure. But otherwise the preference, in my view, should be for nar-
rowly-targeted indicators.
4 How Closely Do the Indicators Correlate with One Another?
How accurate are these indicators? This is in part a theoretical issue, but one way
to get a partial answer is to see how closely they correlate with one another. Table
1a shows the correlations between all of the indicators included here except the
Traxler-Kittel measure of wage coordination, which is categorical. For the indi-
cators that vary over time I have used a period average over 1974–1989. Table 1b
shows correlations among the time-varying indicators using annual data.
Among the interest group organization indicators, a number of findings are
worth highlighting. First, the three union centralization measures correlate fairly
closely with each other (.62 to .84). Second, by contrast, although the Cameron
and Schmitter measures of union concentration are highly correlated with one
another (.84), neither is very strongly correlated with either of the two objective
GWL measures (.09 to .45). This casts doubt on the validity of the former. Second,
concentration across union confederations (GWLCONC1) is weakly or negatively
correlated with every other corporatism indicator. This is due largely to the exis-
tence of only a single main union confederation in several nations in which inter-
est group organization is otherwise relatively minimal – Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Fourth, the new time-varying measure of union
centralization I have created based on the GWL data is very weakly correlated
with both of the time-varying GWL measures of union concentration (.14 and
.18). This contrasts with the moderate-to-strong correlations between the Cam-
eron and Schmitter measures of union centralization and concentration (.50 to
.77). It suggests that these two dimensions of labor organization may be less
similar empirically than has heretofore been believed. Fifth, the two business or-
ganization indicators correlate strongly (.82), despite the fact that one is a meas-
ure of centralization alone while the other incorporates both centralization and
concentration. Interestingly, however, the correlations between these measures of
business organization and the time-varying measures of union centralization and
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union concentration within confederations are weak to moderate (.34 to .57). That
suggests only moderate support for the common presumption that business and
labor organization tend to go hand in hand (e.g., Schmitter and Streeck 1999; Ste-
phens 1979).
There are six true measures of wage centralization – if we exclude the GWL
measures of confederation and government involvement, which are combined to
form the GWL summary indicator, and the Traxler-Kittel measure of bargaining
governability. If one desires a single measure of the level of wage setting, the
GWL summary centralization index seems likely to be the most useful of the six.
Unlike the Cameron, Calmfors-Driffill, and OECD wage centralization indicators,
it is measured annually and thus incorporates changes in wage setting arrange-
ments from year to year, which are not uncommon. Unlike the Traxler-Kittel
centralization indicator, it takes into account the existence (or lack thereof) of a
peace obligation, which surely affects the degree to which local bargaining alters
wage agreements at the central or industry level. And unlike both the Traxler-
Kittel and Iversen centralization indicators, it incorporates government-imposed
wage schedules/freezes. One might reasonably argue that this latter feature
makes the GWL measure less useful as an indicator of corporatism, since such
government imposition does not involve participation by labor and/or business.
But it surely makes it a more accurate indicator of the level of wage setting.
The Calmfors-Driffill wage centralization indicator has been by far the most
commonly used in studies of corporatism’s impact on economic performance. But
its merits have been questioned (Traxler and Kittel 2000). It correlates relatively
strongly with the Cameron, OECD, and Iversen measures but only moderately
with the GWL and Traxler-Kittel measures. The most directly comparable indi-
cator to Iversen’s in terms of conceptual intent is the GWL measure of union con-
federation involvement in bargaining. Yet the two correlate at only .75. This is
likely because the Iversen scores incorporate the share of workers covered at each
bargaining level. In this respect it is the more precise of the two.
The six wage coordination indicators (the Traxler-Kittel measure is excluded be-
cause it is categorical) correlate fairly strongly with one another. In particular, the
Soskice, OECD, Hall-Franzese, and Kenworthy indicators correlate with each
other at .89 or better. This is not too surprising, as the latter three all draw heavily
on Soskice (1990). Among these, the Kenworthy indicator has the advantage of
being measured annually.
In general the wage centralization indicators are only moderately and sometimes
very weakly correlated with the coordination indicators. For instance, the GWL
centralization index correlates between .32 and .52 with the six coordination indi-
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cators. This suggests that these two types of measure are not interchangeable; it
may matter a great deal in terms of empirical findings which of the two is used.
Conceptually, centralization measures seem closer to the essence of what most
analysts consider to be corporatism, but coordination seems more likely to be re-
lated to wage restraint and thus to macroeconomic performance outcomes (see,
e.g., Flanagan 1999; Soskice 1990; Traxler and Kittel 2000).
As noted earlier there are only two indicators of union participation in policy
making, by Lehmbruch and Compston. Given that the Compston measure varies
over time and appears to be based on more careful scrutiny of policy making pro-
cesses, the .52 correlation between them casts serious doubt on the validity of the
Lehmbruch measure, which has been fairly widely used in the literature. Then
again, the Lehmbruch indicator includes wage setting as one of the types of pol-
icy making in which unions may participate whereas the Compston measure ex-
cludes wage setting. This difference could conceivably account for the low corre-
lation. The correlations between the Compston indicator and the measures of in-
terest group organization and wage setting are not especially strong. They are
stronger for the Lehmbruch indicator, probably because it includes wage setting.
In contrast, the two indicators of economic consensus are highly correlated with
each other. Interestingly, although they differ widely in the elements they aggre-
gate, the composite indicators are generally strongly correlated with one another.
Of the 78 correlations among the composite indicators, 46 are larger than .70 and
only nine are below .50.
Finally, the correlations among the time-varying indicators based on annual data,
shown in Table 1b, are generally consistent with those based on 1974–1989 period
averages in Table 1a.
Table 1b Correlations between Time-Varying Corporatism Indicators Using Annual Data
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 KENWUCENT
2 GWLCONC1 .22
3 GWLCONC2 .02 -.51
4 HKBUS .53 -.28 .53
5 KENWBCENT .45 -.27 .41 .79
6 GWLCONF .52 -.19 -.04 .36 .44
7 GWLGOV .29 .01 .01 .00 .09 .54
8 GWLCENT .46 -.15 .23 .31 .46 .75 .72
9 IVERCENT .50 -.03 .33 .54 .47 .70 .52 .59
10 TKCENT .34 -.23 .12 .29 .53 .62 .40 .65 .68
11 KENWCOOR .46 -.17 .61 .68 .52 .44 .47 .62 .71 .38
12 COMPUP .51 .03 .23 .39 .09 .24 .25 .30 .51 .29 .54
13 HKCORP .61 -.28 .58 .93 .78 .48 .15 .44 .67 .35 .75 .44
14 SWNKCORP .66 -.05 .13 .50 .54 .76 .50 .74 .73 .70 .53 .44 .63
Note: N varies from 51 to 630 depending upon the indicators being correlated. TKCOOR is not
included because it is a categorical measure. OECDCENT, OECDCOOR, and LNJCOOR are not
included because they are scored in only a few years. For indicator descriptions see Appendix A.
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5 Effects on Macroeconomic Performance
Probably three-quarters of the empirical research on corporatism since the early
1980s has involved attempts to assess its effects on macroeconomic performance
outcomes (for references see Flanagan 1999; Franzese 1999; Kenworthy 1996). One
of the striking features of this literature is the general lack of attentiveness to the
potential impact of indicator choice.4 In this section I provide a preliminary as-
sessment of the relative utility of the various corporatism indicators in accounting
for cross-country variation in macroeconomic performance. Four performance
indicators – change in nominal wages, inflation, change in real wages, and unem-
ployment – are regressed on each of the corporatism indicators and a set of con-
trol variables in each of two time periods, 1974–1979 and 1980–1989. The variables
are described in Appendixes A and C.
The predominant notion in the literature has been that corporatism yields lower
inflation and/or unemployment by generating wage restraint. The general logic
is relatively simple, though specific applications of it can be complex (see, e.g.,
Franzese 1999; Kenworthy 1996). Where unions are encompassing and/or wage
setting is centralized/coordinated, externalities of high wage increases tend to be
taken into account by union negotiators, which creates a strong incentive for
wage moderation. In fragmented bargaining systems, by contrast, prisoners’ di-
lemma-type incentives create pressure for wage militancy. It is somewhat stun-
ning that to my knowledge only three studies have actually examined the relation-
ship between corporatism and wage changes: Bruno and Sachs (1985), Kenworthy
(1996), and Traxler and Kittel (2000). All others have looked only at the relation-
ship between corporatism and unemployment/inflation and simply presumed
that the hypothesized links between corporatism and wage restraint and between
wage restraint and macroeconomic performance exist. I explore these links here.
Inflation is most likely to be affected by increases in nominal wages, while unem-
ployment is presumed to be a function of increases in real wages.
Much of the corporatist literature has focused on unemployment, and there are a
number of other channels through which corporatism could affect this aspect of
macroeconomic performance. First, centralized or coordinated wage bargaining
may include a “political exchange” – government efforts to reduce unemploy-
ment in exchange for union wage restraint (Pizzorno 1978). If so, indicators of
wage centralization or coordination (and also perhaps interest group organiza-
tion, consensus, and composite corporatism indicators) may be associated with
real wage moderation and low unemployment, but real wage restraint itself
                                                  
4 I am only marginally less guilty of this than most others – see Kenworthy (1996);
Hicks and Kenworthy (1998).
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would not be the direct cause of low unemployment. Second, countries may be
constrained (by, e.g., central banks or participation in a hard currency regime) to
have low inflation. To ensure the wage restraint necessary to achieve this, nations
with less centralized or coordinated wage setting may require higher levels of
unemployment (Soskice 1990). If this is correct, indicators of corporatism may be
unrelated to wage developments and inflation (neither of which would vary
much across countries) but associated with lower unemployment. A third chan-
nel shifts the focus away from wage setting to union participation in economic
policy making. It asserts that “trade union influence over economic policy leads
to more effective policies against unemployment and therefore to lower unem-
ployment than would otherwise be the case” (Compston 1997: 733; see also Bore-
ham and Compston 1992). If this channel is accurate, we would expect indicators
of union participation in policy making to be associated with low unemployment
though not with real wage restraint. A fourth suggests that encompassing, or-
ganized interest groups reduce rent-seeking, thereby contributing to faster
growth and lower unemployment (Olson 1982). If so, indicators of interest group
organization should be related to low unemployment but not necessarily to real
wage moderation. Finally, a fifth possibility is that consensus is a key to reducing
joblessness – via, e.g., real wage restraint, more effective government policies, or
less rent-seeking (McCallum 1986). If this is accurate, consensus indicators should
be associated with lower unemployment and perhaps also real wage moderation.
In early corporatist studies it was common to assert that corporatism was a rele-
vant factor in accounting for cross-national variation in macroeconomic perform-
ance in the 1960s, but recent analyses suggest that this was not the case until the
mid-1970s (Crouch 1993; Flanagan 1999; Kenworthy 1996). Given that most of the
corporatism indicators do not vary over time and that most of the time-varying
indicators do not extend beyond the early 1990s, the most reasonable time period
to use for the analyses here is 1974–1989. I break this into the two business cycles:
1974–1979 and 1980–1989. Aggregating data within business cycles averts non-
comparability (of, e.g., unemployment rates) due to differing phases of business
cycles and avoids confounding business cycle and other effects (Kenworthy 1995;
Korpi 1985; Wolff 1996). The results for some of the indicators suggest that effects
may have differed across these two time periods, which is the reason for exam-
ining them separately.
While most tests have assumed a linear relationship between corporatism and
performance outcomes, others have proposed that corporatism’s effects are
hump-shaped (Calmfors and Driffill 1988) or interactive with institutions such as
left government (Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991), central bank independence
(Hall and Franzese 1998), union density (Kittel 2000), or public sector union den-
sity (Garrett and Way 1999). However, the hump-shaped and left government
interaction hypotheses have found little or no support in follow-up analyses
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(Beck et al. 1993; Flanagan 1999; Hicks and Kenworthy 1998; Kenworthy 1996;
Traxler and Kittel 2000). In any case, it is not possible to test a variety of alterna-
tive specifications here. Instead, I simply enter each corporatism indicator in a bi-
variate regression and then in a multivariate regression with each performance
measure in each time period. The relationship in all of the regressions is pre-
sumed to be linear. (I do, however, examine the central bank independence inter-
action hypothesis; see below.) In the multivariate regressions I include four con-
trol variables that have been commonly used in the literature and for which there
exists a strong theoretical rationale for expecting a link with inflation and unem-
ployment: growth of real GDP, central bank independence, left party govern-
ment, and trade. Given the imposition of uniformity and simplicity in model
specification, the results of these analyses should be taken as merely suggestive.
The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). I also run re-
gressions using annual data for the 10 time-varying indicators that are measured
across a reasonable number of years (this excludes the GWL measure of union
concentration within confederations and the OECD and Layard-Nickell-Jackman
measures of union centralization and coordination) and that contain a nontrivial
degree of year-to-year variation (this excludes the two business organization
measures). These latter are estimated using random-effects generalized least
squares (GLS). This technique helps to control for “unobserved heterogeneity” or
“fixed effects” – a problem inherent to cross-sectional analyses, whereby apparent
effects of a variable such as corporatism may actually be due to unmeasured
country-specific characteristics such as culture (see Alderson and Nielson 1999).
These regressions include dummy variables for each year in the time period ex-
cept one; this focuses on the cross-sectional variation, consistent with the regres-
sions using period averages. In principle, the analyses using annual data should
yield more trustworthy estimates because they control for unobserved heteroge-
neity and because the larger number of observations reduces the likelihood of
undue influence by outliers. On the other hand, a disadvantage of using annual
data is that effects of institutions such as corporatism may lag, and by different
lengths of time in different countries and years. Using period averages reduces
the likelihood of misspecifying such lags.
The regression results are shown in Table 2. Consider first the findings for effects
of the narrowly-targeted measures on nominal wage changes and inflation. Nei-
ther of the two union participation in policy making indicators fares well, but that
is not surprising since there is no hypothesized link between this aspect of corpo-
ratism and wage restraint. Three of the interest group organization indicators
perform impressively: Schmitter’s union centralization index, the GWL index of
concentration within union confederations, and the Hicks-Kenworthy business
organization measure. The same is true for the two measures of economic consen-
sus. By contrast, the wage centralization measures yield unimpressive results.
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They produce a number of unexpected positively signed coefficients, including
some that are statistically significant. This could be because wage centralization
affects nominal wage changes and inflation in a nonlinear or interactive fashion.
But the strong results for the wage coordination indicators seemingly lend sup-
port to theoretical arguments which claim that coordination matters more for
wage developments than does centralization (Soskice 1990). One way to test this
directly is by including both a centralization indicator and a coordination indica-
tor in the same regression. The most suitable indicators for this purpose are the
GWL centralization index (for reasons noted earlier) and the Kenworthy coordi-
nation index (because it is the only coordination indicator measured annually).
The correlation between these two measures is only moderate – .50 using a period
average for 1974–1989 and .62 using annual data (see Tables 1a and 1b) – so mul-
ticollinearity should not prohibit such an assessment. In regressions otherwise
identical to those in Table 2 but with both of these indicators included, the coor-
dination indicator is always negatively signed and almost always statistically sig-
nificant, while the centralization indicator is always positively signed (results not
shown here). This is true whether period averages or annual data are used. These
findings support arguments for the empirical primacy of coordination rather than
centralization with respect to nominal wage change and inflation outcomes.
Changes in nominal wages and inflation correlate positively and quite strongly
with one another, as one might expect. Using period averages, the correlation is
.93 for 1974–1979 and .95 for 1980–1989 (.93 and .96 using annual data). Yet does it
make sense to presume, as does the wage push perspective that underlies the hy-
pothesized link between corporatism and low inflation, that nominal wage
changes affect inflation rather than the other way around? After all, empirical
studies frequently find that wage demands are influenced by the expected rate of
inflation (e.g., Mitchell 1980; Rubin 1986). Obviously there is a degree of reverse
causality here, but the assumption nonetheless seems warranted. For one thing,
workers and unions often do focus on nominal wages (Mitchell 1993). In addition,
careful inspection of the time-series data for individual countries reveals that
noteworthy shifts in the rate of nominal wage increase often precede, rather than
follow, such shifts in inflation.
Let’s turn now to real wage changes and unemployment. Only three of the 40 in-
dicators – the GWL measures of union concentration across confederations, gov-
ernment involvement in wage setting, and wage setting centralization – yield
statistically significant negative associations with real wage changes in the multi-
variate regressions. Interestingly, a number of the indicators are linked with
higher rates of real wage increase. That is not necessarily a distressing result for
workers in corporatist countries, of course, but it belies the common presumption
that corporatism induces real wage restraint.
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For unemployment, about two-thirds of the narrowly-targeted measures yield
negatively signed and statistically significant multivariate coefficients in at least
one of the two time periods. Yet the three indicators that are associated with real
wage restraint are not among this group. This could be because the impact of
corporatism on real wage developments depends on monetary policy (Franzese
1999; Hall and Franzese 1998; Iversen 1998), but regressions using interactions
between wage centralization or coordination and central bank independence
yielded no improvement in the results (not shown here). How should we inter-
pret this? Evidently, to the extent that corporatism lowers unemployment, it does
so via a mechanism other than real wage moderation. Indeed, we should be
skeptical about the purported link between real wage increases and unemploy-
ment itself. The correlation between these two variables, using period averages
(to avoid misspecification of lags), is .34 for 1974–1979 and –.44 for 1980–1989. The
latter correlation suggests, paradoxically, that nations with faster growth of real
wages enjoy lower unemployment. It might be thought that the association is
with change in unemployment, rather than with the level of unemployment. Yet
the correlation between change in real wages and change in the unemployment
rate is –.40 for 1974–1979 and –.43 for 1980–1989.5 Theoretically, the link should
be between change in real unit labor costs (which adjust wage changes for
changes in productivity) and change in unemployment.6 But these correlations
are no more supportive: .04 for 1974–1979 and –.33 for 1980–1989 (–.24 and –.48
for the level of unemployment). Multivariate analyses not shown here yield
similar results. These findings contradict the central assumption underlying
much of the research that has investigated the relationship between corporatism
and unemployment.
What, then, is the link between corporatism and low unemployment? The results
here suggest four possibilities, each mentioned earlier:
1. All countries may aim for low inflation, but nations with less coordinated
wage setting may require higher levels of unemployment in order to secure the
requisite wage restraint. However, this notion seems to be contradicted by the
substantial cross-country diversity in inflation rates in the 1970s and 1980s. It
also is somewhat difficult to square with the finding in Table 2 that several of
the wage coordination indicators are associated with both low unemployment
and low inflation.
                                                  
5 I use a percentage change measure (rather than a difference measure) for unem-
ployment, consistent with that for wages.
6 The regressions for real wage changes in Table 2 are in effect assessing real unit labor
cost changes, since growth of real GDP is included as a regressor.
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2. The result for the Compston union participation in policy making indicator in
the 1980s multivariate regression using annual data suggest some support for
the notion that if such a relationship exists, it is at least in part a function of
corporatism’s impact on government policy choices.
3. The results for what are perhaps the four best indicators of interest group or-
ganization – the Kenworthy measure of union centralization, the GWL meas-
ure of concentration within union confederations, and the two indicators of
business organization – suggest that interest group encompassingness may be
conducive to low unemployment via reduced rent-seeking.
4. Finally, economic consensus might reduce joblessness either by spurring de-
velopment of effective employment policies or by reducing rent-seeking activ-
ity.
A number of the composite measures yield strikingly impressive results for all of
the performance measures other than real wage changes. Very few of the nar-
rowly-targeted measures of interest group organization, wage setting arrange-
ments, or union participation in policy making appear to be as consistently linked
to low nominal wage increases, low inflation, and low unemployment as are, e.g.,
the Bruno-Sachs, Hicks-Kenworthy, Keman, Lijphart-Crepaz, Schmidt, and Ta-
rantelli aggregated indicators. It might therefore seem tempting to conclude that
what really matters in determining macroeconomic performance is the corporatist
“gestalt” – the combination of elements that fit together, and in so doing consti-
tute “more than the sum of the parts” – rather than any single element alone. But
without a clear elaboration of the precise mechanism(s) through which such ef-
fects are generated, it is reasonable to be skeptical about such a claim. None of the
creators of the six composite indicators just mentioned offers such an elaboration.
I am not arguing that the notion of a corporatist “gestalt” which is usefully meas-
ured via a composite indicator is inherently faulty – merely that the case for such
has yet to be effectively made.
One form of the “gestalt” conceptualization is the notion that the effectiveness of
a particular element of corporatism is conditional on the presence of one or more
other elements. For example, one might argue that wage centralization or coordi-
nation is unlikely to yield wage moderation unless unions participate in other ar-
eas of policy making, because otherwise union negotiators will not trust that po-
litical exchanges will be honored. But this type of hypothesis is best tested by in-
cluding these two elements – wage setting arrangements and union participation
in policy making – as separate, interacted variables in regression analyses, rather
than by combining them into a single composite indicator.
Finally, the results of these regressions underscore the sensitivity of findings to
the choice of corporatism measure. A host of studies have concluded that corpo-
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ratism has been conducive to good macroeconomic performance – at least in the
1970s and/or 1980s – and a number of the indicators examined here suggest
support for that view. But some do not. Other analyses, most notably the 1997
OECD study (OECD 1997; see also Smith 1992, 2000; Therborn 1987), conclude
that corporatism is in fact unrelated to inflation and unemployment outcomes.
The findings here for the OECD wage centralization indicator are consistent with
this view, but those for the OECD coordination indicator are not. These types of
inconsistencies highlight the need for more careful attention in empirical studies
to the impact of indicator choice.
6 Effects on Income Distribution and Redistribution
Research in political economy has tended to focus on two types of economic out-
comes:
1. aspects of macroeconomic performance such as unemployment, inflation, and
growth;
2. the distribution and redistribution of income. While the bulk of research on
corporatism’s effects has dealt with the former, a number of studies suggest
that its effects may be no less important, and perhaps moreso, for the latter.
There is good reason to suspect a link between corporatist wage setting and low
pay inequality (Iversen 1999; OECD 1997; Rowthorn 1992; Rueda and Pontusson
2000; Teullings and Hartog 1998; Wallerstein 1999). Unions tend to prefer smaller
pay differentials, and centralized or coordinated bargaining increases unions’
leverage vis-à-vis employers in seeking to achieve this aim. It may also accentuate
the preference for low pay differentials: since the wages for a large share of the
workforce are set simultaneously and collectively, differentials are more trans-
parent. Furthermore, low pay inequality may be one thing that unions request
from employers in exchange for pay restraint.
There is also reason to expect a link between corporatism and government redis-
tributive efforts (Hicks and Swank 1992; Hicks 1999, ch. 6; Hicks and Kenworthy
1998; Swank and Martin 2000). The causal mechanism may run through wage
setting and/or union participation in policy making. Like government efforts to
reduce unemployment, more generous redistributive programs may be requested
by unions in a political exchange for wage moderation. Or they may be a product
of enhanced labor influence on policy stemming from regularized participation
by unions in the policy making process (apart from participation in centralized or
coordinated wage setting).
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To examine the relative merits of the corporatism indicators in accounting for
cross-country variation in pay inequality and in government redistribution, I run
sets of regressions similar to those used above for macroeconomic performance.
Reliable and cross-nationally comparable data on earnings inequality are limited
to the 1980s for most countries, so I confine the analyses to the 1980–1989 period.
Even this is a bit of a stretch for a few countries; for Ireland and Switzerland, for
instance, the earliest year available is 1991. Following Wallerstein (2000) and
Rueda and Pontusson (2000), the earnings inequality measure I use is the 90/10
ratio. In the multivariate regressions I add four control variables, which one or
both of these two studies has found to be influential: left party government, trade,
government employment, and union wage coverage. Redistribution is measured
using government transfers as a share of GDP. The control variables included in
these regressions are left party government, trade, the proportion of the popula-
tion of retirement age (65 years and over), and the unemployment rate (see Hicks
1999; Hicks and Kenworthy 1998; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Iversen and
Cusack 2000). Because data on union wage coverage are not available for Ireland,
it is not included in the analyses for earnings inequality. The same is true for New
Zealand in the government redistribution analyses.
The regression results are shown in Table 3. The findings generally support those
of recent studies which suggest an inverse association between corporatism and
earnings inequality. Of the 41 indicators tested, 25 are negatively signed and sta-
tistically significant in the multivariate regressions. Theoretically, there is no par-
ticular reason to expect an effect of union participation in policy making on the
distribution of earnings, and none is indicated here. Most theoretical arguments
have focused on wage centralization as the aspect of corporatism that is condu-
cive to low levels of pay inequality. Yet several of the centralization measures are
not significant in the multivariate regressions, while several indicators of interest
group organization, wage coordination, and consensus as well as some of the
composite measures yield statistically significant results. This seems worthy of
further exploration. What happens if the GWL centralization and the Kenworthy
coordination indicators are again entered in the same regression? In this instance
the centralization measure appears to be the better predictor. Both variables are
negatively signed, but the centralization measure easily reaches statistical signifi-
cance while the coordination measure is not significant in the bivariate regression
and significant at only the .10 level in the multivariate regression. Still, the latter
result suggests that wage coordination through means other than centralization
may contribute to wage equalization.
For government redistribution the findings are somewhat less supportive of the
hypothesis of corporatist effects. Only 12 of the 41 indicators yield statistically
significant coefficients with the expected positive sign in the multivariate regres-
sions, and 8 of those 12 are significant only at the lenient .10 level. Of the two indica-
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Table 3 Effects of Corporatism on Income Distribution and Redistribution: Regression Results for 
1980–1989
Earnings inequality:
90/10 ratio
Government transfers:
% of GDP
Income inequality (posttax,
posttransfer): 90/10 ratio
1980–1989 1980–1989 circa 1991
Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate
SCHMCENT – ** – + ** + *** – *** –
CAMUCENT – ** – * + ** – – *** –
KENWUCENT – – + * + – ** –
SCHMCONC – – + – – ** –
CAMUCONC – * – + – – *** – *
GWLCONC1 + ** + * – * – * + ** + **
GWLCONC2 – ** – ** + ** + * – *** – ***
HKBUS – ** – ** + + * – *** – ***
KENWBCENT – *** – ** + + – *** – ***
CAMCENT – ** – + * – – *** –
CDCENT – ** – – – – *** – *
OECDCENT – *** – * – – – *** –
GWLCONF – *** – * + – – ** –
GWLGOV – *** – + * – – ** +
GWLCENT – *** – *** + * + – *** –
IVERCENT – ** – ** + – – *** –
TKCENT – ** – ** + + – ** –
TKBARGOV – – – – – *** – **
CRCHCOOR – ** – * + + – *** – ***
SOSKCOOR – – * + + – *** – ***
LNJCOOR – *** – ** + + – *** – ***
OECDCOOR – ** – * + + * – *** – **
HFCOOR – *** – ** + + * – *** – ***
KENWCOOR – *** – ** + + * – *** – **
LEHMUP – ** – + * + * – *** – **
COMPUP – – + * – – * –
MCCLCONS – – ** + + – * – **
PALOCONS – ** – ** + ** + *** – *** – **
AGLCORP – *** – * + * – ** – *** –
BSCORP – ** – * + + – *** – ***
CAMCORP – ** – + + – *** –
HKCORP – *** – ** + + ** – *** – ***
HSCORP – *** – * + + – *** –
KEMNCORP – *** – *** – + – *** – ***
LEHNCORP – ** – *** + – – ** – *
LCCORP – *** – ** + + ** – *** – ***
SMDTCORP – ** – *** – + * – *** – **
SCHMCORP – * – * + + – *** – *
SWNKCORP – *** – *** + – – *** –
TARACORP – – + + * – * – **
WESTCORP – *** – + + – *** – ***
Note: Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients. Control variables included in the multivariate re-
gressions for earnings inequality and income inequality are: left party government, trade, government
employment, and union wage coverage. For government transfers the control variables are: left party
government, trade, aged, and unemployment. Missing data prevent inclusion of Ireland in the regres-
sions for earnings inequality and income inequality and of New Zealand in the regressions for govern-
ment transfers. TKCOOR is not included because it is a categorical measure. For variable descriptions
see Appendixes A, B, and C.
* = p < .10
** = p < .05
*** = p < .01 (one-tailed tests)
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tors of union participation in policy making, only the Lehmbruch measure, which
is probably the less valid of the two, is suggestive of a positive effect. This casts
doubt on the second of the hypothesized causal channels described above. The
first channel focuses on political exchange. Surprisingly, none of the wage central-
ization measures is statistically significant in the multivariate regressions, while
several of the coordination measures are. This suggests that political exchange
may occur not only in contexts of centralized bargaining but also where coordi-
nation is achieved in other ways, such as via guidance by a highly concentrated
union confederation (as in Austria) or pattern-setting (as in Denmark and Ger-
many). Overall, then, these results leave us somewhat in the dark as to whether
or not corporatism promotes redistribution and, if it does, what is the causal
mechanism through which this effect occurs.
If corporatism reduces pay inequality (as seems to be the case) and/or increases
government redistributive efforts (as may be the case), we would expect it to be
associated with lower levels of posttax and posttransfer income inequality. Also
included in Table 3 are results of regressions using 90/10 ratios from the best
available data set on income distribution, the Luxembourg Income Study, as the
dependent variable. These data are available for only a few years for most coun-
tries; I use figures for 1991. Pay inequality and government transfers are uncor-
related with one another (r = .01), which suggests that the distribution of earnings
and government redistribution are quite distinct determinants of the posttax,
posttransfer distribution of income (see also Burniaux et al. 1998; Kenworthy
1999). The regression results in the last two columns of Table 3 are about as one
might expect, given the findings for earnings inequality and government trans-
fers. All but one of the 41 indicators is negatively signed and statistically signifi-
cant in the bivariate regressions, and 24 remain significant when the control vari-
ables are added. Interestingly, however, none of the wage centralization meas-
ures is significant in the multivariate equations. This again may be due to the fact
that these measures are poor predictors of government redistribution, since they
fail to predict political exchange in noncentralized but coordinated settings.
7 Conclusion
Quantitative research on corporatism is a relatively well-developed field – one of
the most influential in comparative political economy over the past two decades.
Yet in some respects it is still in its infancy. Theoretical development has ad-
vanced considerably in recent years, but a number of uncertainties and disagree-
ments persist (Flanagan 1999; Franzese 1999). Since the mid-1990s, quantitative
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indicators of corporatism have also improved a great deal. However, as we have
seen, the indicators themselves and the ways in which they have been used are
not without flaws.
The principal conclusions that emerge from this survey are as follows. I begin
with the indicators themselves and then turn to corporatism’s effects.
1. Indicators of corporatism abound. Given that there are various elements or
types of corporatism and that each can be measured in different ways, this should
be viewed in a positive light. The chief potential ill effect of such a proliferation of
measures is chaos in the field. One of the aims of this study has been to help bring
some order to it.
2. Interest group organization, wage setting arrangements, interest group partici-
pation in policy making, and political-economic consensus are certainly the prin-
cipal aspects or types of corporatism as it is commonly conceptualized. In this re-
spect the existing set of indicators is adequate in its overall scope. Yet a few
noteworthy gaps remain. One is the lack of objective measures of concentration
across and within employer confederations. A second is the lack of a measure of
participation in policy making by organized business. A third is the lack of a
time-varying measure of consensus. A fourth is the lack of indicators of sub-
national corporatism. Paradoxically, as national economies become more closely
integrated, sub-national (regional and/or local) economic institutions may come
to play a more prominent and important role in determining economic outcomes
(Streeck and Schmitter 1991). The early corporatist literature paid a good deal of
attention to “mesocorporatism” (Cawson 1985), but there has been little effort to
construct quantitative indicators of corporatist arrangements at the sub-national
level (for one attempt see Leicht and Jenkins 1998).
3. The relatively weak correlations between recent time-varying indicators of in-
terest group organization, wage setting arrangements, and union participation in
policy making and some of their time-invariant predecessors from the early cor-
poratist literature cast doubt on the accuracy of the latter. Given the availability of
time-varying indicators for most aspects of corporatism, and given that most of
these indicators suggest a nontrivial degree of change over time in a number of
countries, there is now little rationale for using time-invariant measures in em-
pirical analyses.
4. Unfortunately, many of the recently-created time-varying measures do not
cover all 18 of the countries commonly used in quantitative research on the politi-
cal economy of affluent democratic capitalism. Studies utilizing these measures
therefore run the risk of selection bias. In addition, for time-varying measures to
be of optimal use, it is imperative that they be regularly updated. That is not an
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easy task with subjective indicators; it takes quite a bit of work. But it needs to be
done.7
5. Many quantitative indicators of corporatism are composite measures. Yet
creators and users of such measures have not, in my view, offered a compelling
explication of how effects of corporatism are generated in such a way that they
are more accurately captured by aggregated indicators than by narrowly-targeted
ones.
6. Which of the narrowly-targeted corporatism indicators would I recommend for
use in empirical research? Among the three indicators of union centralization, the
new one I have created here seems preferable as it is based on the reliable GWL
data and varies over time. The same is true for the two GWL measures of union
concentration. The two measures of business organization seem of comparable
quality; the choice of which to use should be guided by whether one prefers a
measure that focuses on centralization alone or one that attempts to combine
centralization and concentration. Of the nine indicators of wage centralization,
the GWL summary index strikes me as the best, since it is time-varying and takes
into account both government-imposed wage schedules/freezes and the exis-
tence (or lack thereof) of a peace obligation. For wage coordination, the only indi-
cator that varies over time and is measured annually is the Kenworthy measure.
Among the two indicators of union participation in policy making, the same
holds for the Compston measure. Unfortunately, both of the existing indicators of
consensus are time-invariant and are based largely on strike rates. As noted ear-
lier, in my view these features make these measures of questionable utility.
What can we conclude about corporatism’s effects on macroeconomic perform-
ance and income distribution and redistribution?
1. Coordinated wage setting appears to be (linearly) associated with nominal
wage restraint and low inflation, at least in the 1980s. No such link is evident for
indicators of wage centralization. This supports the contention that wage mod-
eration is a function of coordination, whether that coordination is achieved via
centralization or other means.
2. Corporatism appears to be conducive to low unemployment. However, there is
virtually no evidence of a link between corporatism and real wage moderation,
nor between real wage changes and (levels of or changes in) unemployment.
                                                  
7 The same complaint can be rendered about other political-economic institutions. At
the time of this writing, for instance, none of the commonly-used indicators of central
bank independence extend beyond 1990. This is extremely problematic for anyone
wishing to conduct analyses of the effects of central bank independence in the 1990s,
since the degree of bank autonomy increased in a number of countries in that decade.
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Thus, the channel(s) through which corporatism reduces unemployment, if it in-
deed does, is likely not the one presupposed in much of the theoretical and em-
pirical literature.
3. Centralized wage setting and possibly also other aspects of corporatism seem
clearly linked to smaller pay differentials. Whether or not corporatism heightens
government redistributive efforts, and if so how, is less clear. Overall, there is
fairly strong indication of an association between corporatism and low levels of
posttax/posttransfer income inequality. Curiously, however, wage centralization
is the one element or type of corporatism for which no such association is appar-
ent.
4. Of the corporatism indicators examined here, the one that appears to be most
consistently linked to strong macroeconomic performance, egalitarian income
distribution, and generous redistribution is Paloheimo’s measure of economic
consensus. The McCallum consensus measure also performs very well in almost
all of the regressions. Should we conclude, then, that the most beneficial aspect of
corporatism is consensus? That depends in part upon what is meant by “consen-
sus.” The two consensus indicators are derived largely from strike rates, which
leaves open the question whether consensus, to the extent it matters, is a function
more of consensual attitudes or of institutions, such as centralized/coordinated
wage setting or tripartite economic policy concertation, which discourage conflict.
This issue seems worthy of further exploration.
5. Finally, given the plentitude of corporatism indicators and the fairly extensive
variation in results in Tables 2 and 3 across indicators of the same aspect or type
of corporatism, empirical studies need to be much more attentive to the effects of
choice of measure. Perhaps making this relatively comprehensive set of quantita-
tive indicators of corporatism easily accessible will facilitate that.
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Appendix A 42 Quantitative Indicators of Corporatism
Interest Group Organization
Union Centralization
SCHMCENT Schmitter union centralization
Rank ordering (I reversed the scores so that higher scores indicate greater centralization)
Time invariant
Time period covered: none specified
Missing countries: Australia, Japan, New Zealand
Source: Schmitter (1981: 294, “organizational centralization”)
CAMUCENT Cameron union centralization
Index ranging from 0 to 1
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1965–1980
Missing countries: New Zealand
Source: Cameron (1984: 165, “confederation power in collective bargaining”)
KENWUCENT Kenworthy union centralization
Index ranging from 0 to 4. Calculated as the number of the following powers /capacities that the
main union confederation has: power of appointment of affiliates, veto over wage agree-
ments by affiliates, veto over strikes, confederation has its own strike funds.
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1950–1992
Missing countries: Ireland, New Zealand
Source: My construction from Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997, variables = CON11,
CON12, CON13, CON14)
Union Concentration
SCHMCONC Schmitter union concentration
Rank ordering (I reversed the scores so that higher scores indicate greater centralization)
Time invariant
Time period covered: none specified
Missing countries: Australia, Japan, New Zealand
Source: Schmitter (1981: 294, “associational monopoly”)
CAMUCONC Cameron union concentration
Index ranging from 0 to 1
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1965–1980
Missing countries: New Zealand
Source: Cameron (1984: 165, “organizational unity of labor”)
GWLCONC1 Golden-Wallerstein-Lange union concentration – across confederations
Herfindahl index of union concentration across union confederations. This indicates the extent to
which union members belong to a single confederation rather than being divided among
multiple confederations.
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1950–1992
Missing countries: Ireland, New Zealand – also Belgium (selected years), Finland, (prior to 1968),
Italy (prior to 1977), Netherlands (selected years)
Source: Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997, variable = HERF). For helpful discussion see
Wallerstein (1999).
GWLCONC2 Golden-Wallerstein-Lange union concentration – within confederations
Approximate Herfindahl index of union concentration for affiliates of the largest union confedera-
tion, using the membership of the three largest affiliates and the total number of affiliates.
This indicates the extent to which the membership of the largest union confederation is
concentrated within a small number of affiliates rather than being spread out across a large
number of affiliates.
Varies over time – measured in 5-year intervals (1950, 1955, and so on)
Time period covered: 1950–1992
Missing countries: France, Ireland, New Zealand
Source: Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997, variable = APPHRF1). For helpful discussion
see Wallerstein (1999).
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Business Centralization /Concentration
HKBUS Hicks-Kenworthy business centralization /concentration
Index with 3 categories: 0 = fragmentation among business confederations and/  or central
confederation with little authority over members. 0.5 = central confederation with moderate
authority and/or moderately contested by competitors. 1 = central confederation with
substantial authority over members and weakly contested by competing confederations.
Varies over time (though in fact very little) – measured annually
Time period covered: 1960–1994
Missing countries: none
Source: Hicks and Kenworthy (1998: 1642)
KENWBCENT Kenworthy business centralization
Index with 3 categories: 1 = no peak employer confederation. 2 = peak employer confederation
exists but has none of the powers / resources listed under 3 below. 3 = peak employer
confederation exists and has one or more of the following: power of appointment of affili-
ates, veto over wage agreements, veto over lockouts, confederation has its own conflict
funds. The scoring for this index differs from that for union centralization (KENWUCENT
above) for two reasons. First, while all of the countries have a peak union confederation,
some do not have a counterpart business confederation. Second, there is little variation
among countries that do have a peak business confederation in the number of powers /
capacities held by the confederation.
Varies over time (though in fact very little) – measured annually
Time period covered: 1950–1992
Missing countries: Ireland, New Zealand
Source: My construction from Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997, variables = EMCONV1,
EMCONV2, EMCONV3, EMCONV4, EMCONV5)
Wage Setting/Bargaining Arrangements
Wage Setting/Bargaining Centralization
CAMCENT Cameron wage bargaining centralization
Index ranging from 0 to 1
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1965–1980
Missing countries: New Zealand
Source: Cameron (1984: 165, “scope of collective bargaining”)
CDCENT Calmfors-Driffill wage bargaining centralization
Rank ordering (I reversed the scores so that higher scores indicate greater centralization)
Time invariant
Time period covered: none specified
Missing countries: Ireland
Source: Calmfors and Driffill (1988: 18)
OECDCENT OECD wage bargaining centralization
Index ranging from 1 to 3
Varies over time – measured in 1980, 1990, and 1994
Time period covered: 1980s and 1990s
Missing countries: Ireland
Source: OECD (1997: 71)
GWLCONF Golden-Wallerstein-Lange wage bargaining centralization – by union confederation(s)
Index of involvement by union confederation(s) in wage setting, with 11 categories: 1 = confed-
eration(s) uninvolved in wage setting in any of the subsequent ways; 2 = confederation(s)
participates in talks or in formulation of demands for some affiliates; 3 = confederation(s)
participates in talks or in formulation of demands for all affiliates; 4 = confederation(s)
negotiates non-wage benefits; 5 = confederation(s) negotiates a part of the wage agree-
ment, such as the cost-of-living adjustment; 6 = confederation(s) represents affiliates in
mediation with centralized ratification; 7 = confederation(s) represents affiliates in arbitra-
tion; 8 = confederation(s) bargains for affiliates in industry-level negotiations; 9 = confed-
eration(s) negotiates national wage agreement without peace obligation; 10 = confedera-
tion(s) negotiates national wage agreement with peace obligation; 11 = confederation(s)
negotiates national wage agreement with limits on supplementary bargaining.
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1950–1992
Missing countries: Ireland, New Zealand
Source: Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997, variable = CONINV). For helpful discussion
see Wallerstein (1999).
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GWLGOV Golden-Wallerstein-Lange wage setting centralization – by government
Index of government involvement in wage setting, with 15 categories: 1 = government uninvolved
in wage setting; 2 = government establishes minimum wage(s); 3 = government extends
collective agreements; 4 = government provides economic forecasts to bargaining part-
ners; 5 = government recommends wage guidelines or norms; 6 = government and union
negotiate wage guidelines; 7 = government imposes wage controls in selected industries;
8 = government imposes cost-of-living adjustment; 9 = formal tripartite agreement for
national wage schedule without sanctions; 10 = formal tripartite agreement for national
wage schedule with sanctions; 11 = government arbitrator imposes wage schedules with-
out sanctions on unions; 12 = government arbitrator imposes national wage schedule with
sanctions; 13 = government imposes national wage schedule with sanctions;
14 = formal tripartite agreement for national wage schedule with supplementary local bar-
gaining prohibited; 15 = government imposes wage freeze and prohibits supplementary lo-
cal bargaining.
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1950–1992
Missing countries: Ireland, New Zealand
Source: Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997, variable = GOVIN). For helpful discussion see
Wallerstein (1999).
GWLCENT Golden-Wallerstein-Lange wage setting centralization – summary indicator
Index with 4 categories: 1 = plant-level wage setting; 2 = industry-level wage setting;
3 = centralized wage setting without sanctions; 4 = centralized wage setting with sanctions.
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1950–1992
Missing countries: Ireland, New Zealand
Source: Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997, variable = BARGLEV). For helpful discussion
see Wallerstein (1999).
IVERCENT Iversen wage bargaining centralization
Range = 0 to 1. Calculated as (wj p2ij)1 / 2, where wj is the weight accorded to each bargaining
level j ( wj =1) and pij is the share of workers covered by union (or federation) i at level j.
(The square root is used simply to heighten somewhat the difference in scores between
decentralized cases.) The index combines a measure of the prevalent level of bargaining
(wj) with a measure of union concentration (pij). There are 7 weight scores for bargaining
level (each with a weight for centralized, intermediate, and decentralized, respectively),
as follows: 0, 0.1, 0.9 = Plant- and firm-level bargaining predominates with some elements
of industry-level bargaining. 0.1, 0, 0.9 = National associations and the government set
nonenforceable targets for plant-level bargaining, but local organizations retain rights to
bargain and to call strikes or lockouts. 0, 0.8, 0.2 = Industry-level organizations monopolize
bargaining and strike / lockout decisions, and agreements are enforceable. Local bargaining
is permitted subject to a peace clause. 0.1, 0.7, 0.2 = National associations and/or the
government set nonenforceable targets for lower-level bargaining, but industry-level
organizations retain rights to bargain enforceable agreements. Local bargaining is permit-
ted subject to a peace clause. 0.5, 0.3, 0.2 = National associations negotiate central
agreements with some capacity for enforceability, but industry-level organizations retain
the right to bargain separate agreements without adherence to a peace clause. 0.8, 0, 0.2
= National associations monopolize bargaining, and agreements are enforceable. Local
bargaining is permitted subject to a peace clause. 0.9, 0, 0.1 = National associations
monopolize wage bargaining, and agreements are enforceable. Lower-level bargaining
is banned.
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1973–1993
Missing countries: Ireland, New Zealand
Source: Iversen (1998; data at http: / /www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen /centralization.htm).
TKCENT Traxler-Kittel wage bargaining centralization – bargaining level
Index with 12 categories (I reversed the scores so that higher scores indicate greater centraliza-
tion): 1 = company, group-specific bargaining; 1.5 = company (all groups and group-
specific bargaining equally important); 2 = company, all employees bargain jointly; 3 =
combination of industry and company (group-specific); 3.5 = combination of industry and
company (all groups and group-specific equally important); 4 = combination of industry
and company (both all groups jointly); 5 = industry, group-specific bargaining (including
occupational bargaining); 6 = industry, all employees bargain jointly; 7 = combination of
central, industry, company (group-specific); 7.58 = combination of central, industry, com-
pany (central: all groups, all other levels group-specific; 8 = combination of interindustry,
industry, and company; 9 = combination of interindustry and industry levels (group-
specific); 10 = combination of interindustry and industry levels (all groups jointly);
11 = interindustry level whereby distinct employee groups bargain separately;
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12 = interindustry (central) level, whereby all employee groups bargain jointly
Varies over time – measured in 3-to-5 year periods (1970–1973, 1974–1976, 1977–1979,
1980–1982, 1983–1985, 1986–1990)
Time period covered: 1970–1990
Missing countries: none
Source: Traxler and Kittel (2000, table 2)
TKBARGOV Traxler-Kittel wage bargaining centralization – degree of bargaining governability
Dichotomous measure: 0 = no general or special peace obligation; 1 = legal enforceability of
collective agreements in combination with either a general peace obligation or a special
peace obligation on workplace representatives
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1970–1990
Missing countries: none
Source: Traxler and Kittel (2000, table 2)
Wage Setting Coordination
CRCHCOOR Crouch wage setting coordination
Dichotomous measure: 0 = uncoordinated (“liberal”); 1 = coordinated (“neocorporatist”).
Combines a measure of the prevalent level of wage bargaining with a measure of union
concentration.
Time invariant
Time period covered: none specified
Missing countries: none
Source: Crouch (1985: 117)
SOSKCOOR Soskice wage setting coordination
Index ranging from 0 to 5. United States and United Kingdom (0): zero employer and union coor-
dination. France (1.5): tacit government coordination via public services and large nation-
alized industry sector. Italy (2): informal employer coordination via big employers, espe-
cially Fiat, IRI, and some regional employer associations; some help from union confedera-
tions, CGIL and CISL. Netherlands (3): strong employer organizations and informal coordi-
nation between giant companies; occasional differences between giants and industry
organizations; medium union coordination. Germany (3.5): strong employer organizations,
with considerable coordination across industries; medium-strong union coordination.
Sweden (4): powerful centralized employers organization; generally strong coordination
across industries, with some divergence of interests; centralized union confederations with
some internal conflicts. Norway (4): as Sweden, with government playing an additional co-
ordinating role. Switzerland (4): very powerful employer organizations, playing tacit coordi-
nating role; unions weak and pliant. Austria (5): very powerful union, with centralized coor-
dinating role; medium-strong employer organizations. Japan (5): very powerful tacit em-
ployer coordination across large companies, in more or less centralized way, with backing
from industry employer organizations; weak and pliant unions.
Time invariant
Time period covered: mid-to-late 1980s
Missing countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand
Source: Soskice (1990: 55)
LNJCOOR Layard-Nickell-Jackman wage setting coordination
Index ranging from 2 to 6. Sum of index for coordination by unions and index for coordination by
employers, each of which ranges from 1 to 3.
Varies over time – measured in 1983 and 1989
Time period covered: 1983–1988 and 1989–1994
Missing countries: none
Source: Layard and Nickell (1994: 277); Nickell (1997: 63). Both draw on Layard, Nickell,
and Jackman (1991, Annex 1.4).
OECDCOOR OECD wage setting coordination
Index ranging from 1 to 3
Varies over time – measured in 1980, 1990, and 1994
Time period covered: 1980s and 1990s
Missing countries: Ireland
Source: OECD (1997: 71)
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HFCOOR Hall-Franzese wage setting coordination
Index with 5 categories: 0, .25, .50, .75, 1.0
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1955–1990
Missing countries: none
Source: Hall and Franzese (1998; data at http: / /www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/
h&f_data.TXT, variable = HCWB). Uses scoring by Soskice (1990), extended to a wider
range of countries based on information from Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and
others (see Hall and Franzese 1998: 516).
KENWCOOR Kenworthy wage setting coordination
Index with 5 categories: 1 = fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or
plants (Canada, Ireland 1960–1969 and 1981–1987, New Zealand since 1988, United
Kingdom since 1980, United States). 2 = bargaining mainly at industry-level with little or
no pattern-setting (France, Italy in most years, Australia since 1992). 3 = industry-level
bargaining with reasonably strong pattern-setting but only moderate union concentration
(Denmark in most years since 1981, Finland and Norway in a few years, Sweden since
1994); government wage arbitration (Australia prior to 1981, New Zealand prior to 1988).
4 = centralized bargaining by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage schedule /
freeze – without a peace obligation (Belgium and Finland in most years, Ireland 1970–1980
and 1987–1993, Italy and Netherlands since 1993); high degree of union concentration and
extensive, regularized pattern-setting (Germany); tacit coordination of bargaining by em-
ployer organizations with extensive pattern-setting (Switzerland). 5 = centralized bargaining
by confederation(s) or government imposition of wage schedule / freeze – with a peace ob-
ligation (Denmark 1960–1980, Ireland since 1994, Norway in most years, Sweden 1960–
1982); extremely high degree of union concentration and coordination of industry
bargaining by confederation (Austria); extensive coordination of bargaining by employer
organizations with extensive pattern-setting (Japan). This is a revision and extension of the
wage coordination measure in Hicks and Kenworthy (1998: 1642). It draws heavily on
Soskice (1990) and the Golden-Wallerstein-Lange summary index of wage setting
centralization (GWLCENT above), supplemented by Iversen (1998: 500) and by country
reports in the monthly European Industrial Relations Review, the European Industrial
Relations Observatory website (http: / /www.eiro.eurofound.ie), Ferner and Hyman (1998),
and other sources.
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1960–1999
Missing countries: none
Source: Kenworthy (2000)
TKCOOR Traxler-Kittel wage setting coordination
Categorical classification of type of bargaining coordination: 1 = inter-associational coordination;
2 = intra-associational coordination; 3 = pattern-setting; 4 = state-imposed coordination;
5 = no coordination; 6 = state-sponsored coordination
Varies over time – measured in 3-to-5 year periods (1970–1973, 1974–1976, 1977–1979,
1980–1982, 1983–1985, 1986–1990)
Time period covered: 1970–1990
Missing countries: none
Source: Traxler and Kittel (2000, table 2)
Interest Group Participation in Policy Making
LEHMUP Lehmbruch union participation in economic policy making, including but not limited
to wage setting
Index with 4 categories: 1 = pluralism; 2 = weak corporatism; 3 = medium corporatism;
4 = strong corporatism
Time invariant
Time period covered: none specified
Missing countries: France, Japan (these 2 countries are categorized as “concertation
without labor”)
Source: Lehmbruch (1984: 66, “nature of union participation in public policy formation”)
COMPUP Compston union participation in economic policy making, excluding wage setting
Index with 11 categories: 0 = no participation; 1–3 = narrow consultation; 4–6 = broad
consultation; 7–8 = narrow agreement; 9–10 = broad agreement
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1970–1992
Missing countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United States
Source: Compston (1997: 738)
Kenworthy: Quantitative Indicators of Corporatism 41
Political-Economic Consensus
MCCLCONS McCallum economic consensus
Dichotomous measure: 0 = low consensus; 1 = high consensus. Based on strike levels
and industrial relations institutions.
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1970s and 1980s
Missing countries: none
Source: McCallum (1986: 954)
PALOCONS Paloheimo economic consensus
Index with 3 categories: 1 = weak economic consensus; 2 = medium economic consensus;
3 = strong economic consensus. Based on working days lost due to strikes.
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1960s and 1970s
Missing countries: New Zealand
Source: Paloheimo (1984: 173)
Composite Corporatism Measures
AGLCORP Alvarez-Garrett-Lange composite corporatism measure
Calculated as the standardized score for (Cameron’s union concentration x Cameron’s union
centralization x Cameron’s wage setting centralization) + the standardized score for union
density
Time invariant
Time period covered: none specified
Missing countries: Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland
Source: Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange (1991, table A-1)
BSCORP Bruno-Sachs composite corporatism measure
Calculated as the sum of 0, .5, 1 scores for: union movement centralization,
low shop-floor autonomy, employer coordination, and works councils
Time invariant
Time period covered: none specified
Missing countries: Ireland
Source: Bruno and Sachs (1985: 227)
CAMCORP Cameron composite corporatism measure
Calculated as [union concentration + (union centralization x union density)]
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1965–1980
Missing countries: Ireland
Source: Cameron (1984: 165–166, “organizational power of labor”)
HKCORP Hicks-Kenworthy composite corporatism measure
Average of 0, .5, 1 scores for 7 types of economic cooperation: business centralization, wage
setting coordination, cooperation between government and interest groups, tripartite
neocorporatism (measured with two indicators: the Lijphart-Crepaz corporatism measure
and the Hicks-Swank corporatism measure), cooperation between investors and firms, and
cooperation between labor and management
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1960–1994
Missing countries: none
Source: Hicks and Kenworthy (1998: 1642–1643)
HSCORP Hicks-Swank composite corporatism measure
Loadings from factor analysis of a variety of corporatist-type variables – particularly union
strength, union centralization, class mobilization, and left-party government.
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1960
Missing countries: none
Source: Hicks and Swank (1992: 662, “left corporatism”)
KEMNCORP Keman composite corporatism measure
Index with 5 categories, ranging from no corporatism to strong corporatism. The scoring is based
on the degree to which there exists an ideology of social partnership and the degree to
which the state plays an active part in shaping the system of industrial relations.
Time invariant
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Time period covered: 1967–1981
Missing countries: none
Source: Keman (1984)
LEHNCORP Lehner composite corporatism measure
Index with 5 categories: 1 = pluralism: fragmented and segmented interest intermediation.
2 = weak corporatism: institutionalized participation of organized labor in certain areas;
narrow scope of collective bargaining. 3 = medium corporatism: sectoral participation;
but broad scope of collective bargaining. 4 = strong corporatism: tripartite concertation
with broad scope; comprehensive coordination of income policies; 5 = concordance:
comprehensive coordination of the interactions of the private and the public sector.
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1960–1980
Missing countries: New Zealand
Source: Lehner (1988: 74)
LCCORP Lijphart-Crepaz composite corporatism measure
Calculated as the average of standardized scores of 12 measures used in prior literature
Time invariant
Time period covered: none specified
Missing countries: none
Source: Lijphart and Crepaz (1991: 239)
SMDTCORP Schmidt composite corporatism measure
Index with 3 categories: 1 = weak; 2 = medium; 3 = strong. “’Strong Corporatism’ covers all those
countries in which (a) the trade union leadership and the employers’ associations are
committed to a social partnership ideology; (b) the state, the trade unions, and the employ-
ers’ associations cooperate in some economic policy areas; (c) the strike volume between
1974 and 1978 is very low; (d) no authoritarian incomes policy was enacted by the state”
(257).
Time invariant.
Time period covered: 1974–1978
Missing countries: none
Source: Schmidt (1982: 245)
SCHMCORP Schmitter composite corporatism measure
Rank ordering (I reversed the scores so that higher scores indicate more corporatist).
Combines Schmitter’s union centralization and concentration measures.
Time invariant
Time period covered: none specified
Missing countries: Australia, Japan, New Zealand
Source: Schmitter (1981: 294, “societal corporatism”)
SWNKCORP Swank composite corporatism measure
An index of standardized scores for union density, union confederation power (e.g., control over
strike funds, involvement in wage bargaining), and the level of wage setting, with each of
these three components weighted by a factor score loading
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1962–1994
Missing countries: Ireland, New Zealand
Source: Swank (2000, using data from the GWL data set)
TARACORP Tarantelli composite corporatism measure
Index ranging from 3 to 15, which is a sum of 1–5 scores for 3 dimensions: (1) the degree to
which there is not only a high ideological and political consensus but also a high integration
and cooperation of trade unions and employers’ representatives with the political and eco-
nomic machinery of the government; (2) the degree of centralization of wage setting; (3)
the process of dispute settlement.
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1968–1983
Missing countries: Ireland, Switzerland
Source: Tarantelli (1986: 12–13, “degree of centralization of the industrial relations system”)
WESTCORP Western composite corporatism measure
Revision of Bruno-Sachs composite corporatism measure (see above).
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1950s to early 1980s
Missing countries: none
Source: Western (1997: 40–41, “labor market centralization”)
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Appendix B Related Indicators of Labor Organization and 
Wage Setting Arrangements
DENSITY Union density
Adjusted density: the total number of union members less those who are self-employed, retired,
or unemployed divided by the dependent labor force.
Varies over time – measured annually
Time period covered: 1950–1992
Missing countries: Ireland, New Zealand
Source: Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997, variable = DENADJ), using data from Visser
(n.d.)
COVERAGE Union wage bargaining coverage
Unadjusted coverage rate: the number of workers covered by collective agreements divided by
the dependent labor force. (For Italy the adjusted coverage rate is used, the denominator
for which is the number of workers with the legal right to bargain.)
Time invariant
Time period covered: 1990 (1985 for Denmark and France)
Missing countries: Ireland
Source: Traxler (1996: 274). Data for Italy are from Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997,
variable = UNADJCOV).
Appendix C Additional Variables Used in the Regression Analyses
Macroeconomic Performance Indicators
Nominal wage changes Change in compensation per employee. Source: This indicator represents
year-to-year percentage change in an index of nominal wages. It corre-
sponds to the OECD Economic Outlook variable WSSS, but these data are
not directly available from the OECD. They are my calculations from nominal
unit labor cost data and GDP data in OECD (1999c, database = OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook, indicators = unit labor cost (ULC) and gross domestic prod-
uct, volume (GDPV)). Calculated as year-to-year percentage change in [the
nominal unit labor cost index multiplied by the volume GDP index]. An ad-
justment has been made to the figure for Germany in 1991 based on unit la-
bor cost data in OECD (1999a: 207).
Inflation Percentage change in the consumer price index. Source: My calculations
from consumer price index data in OECD (1999c, database = Main Eco-
nomic Indicators, indicator = prices → consumer price index → all items →
CPI all items → index publication base).
Real wage changes Change in compensation per employee adjusted for inflation. Source: My
calculations from OECD data on change in nominal wages and inflation (see
above). Calculated as year-to-year percentage change in [the nominal wage
index divided by the consumer price index]. An adjustment has been made
to the figure for Germany in 1991 based on unit labor cost data in OECD
(1999a: 207).
Unemployment Unemployment as a percentage of the total labor force. Source: Data for
1987 ff. are from OECD (1999b: 45). Data for years prior to 1987 are from
OECD (1995).
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Income Distribution and Redistribution Indicators
Earnings inequality Ratio of earnings (gross income from employment) at the 90th percentile to
earnings at the 10th percentile. Source: OECD (n.d.).
Government transfers Social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD
(1999b: 71).
Income inequality Ratio of income (posttax and posttransfer) at the 90th percentile to income
at the 10th percentile. Source: Luxembourg Income Study (n.d.). Data for
Japan and New Zealand are from Smeeding (1998: 200).
Control Variables
Growth of real GDP Source: My calculations from real GDP data in OECD (1999c, database =
National Accounts I, indicator = gross domestic product (expenditure) in US$
– exchange rates and price levels of 1990).
Central bank independence Composite of several commonly used measures. Source: Hall and Franzese
(1998; data at http: / /www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/h&f_data.TXT,
variable = CBI).
Left party government Left party cabinet portfolios as a percentage of all cabinet portfolios. Source:
Swank (n.d., variable = LEFTC).
Trade Exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Source: Data for 1987 ff. are
my calculations from data in OECD (1999b: 75–76). Data for years prior to
1987 are my calculations from data in OECD (1995).
Government employment Government employment as a percentage of total employment. Source:
OECD (1999b: 44).
Union wage coverage Workers covered by collective wage agreements as a percentage of the
dependent labor force. (For Italy the adjusted coverage rate is used, the
denominator for which is the number of workers with the legal right to bar-
gain.) Source: Traxler (1996: 274). Data for Italy are from Golden, Waller-
stein, and Lange (1997, variable = ADJCOV).
Aged Percentage of the population age 65 and over. Source: United Nations
(various years).
Unemployment See above.
Kenworthy: Quantitative Indicators of Corporatism 45
References
Alderson, Arthur S./Francois Nielsen, 1999: Income Inequality, Development, and De-
pendence: A Reconsideration. In: American Sociological Review 64, 606–631.
Alvarez, R. Michael/Geoffrey Garrett/Peter Lange, 1991: Government Partisanship, La-
bor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance. In: American Political Science Re-
view 85, 539–556.
Beck, Nathaniel/Jonathan Katz/R. Michael Alvarez/Geoffrey Garrett/Peter Lange,
1993: Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Perform-
ance: A Corrigendum. In: American Political Science Review 87, 945–948.
Boreham, Paul/Hugh Compston, 1992: Labour Movement Organization and Political
Intervention: The Politics of Unemployment in the OECD Countries, 1974–1986. In:
European Journal of Political Research 22, 143–170.
Bruno, Michael/Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1985: Economics of Worldwide Stagflation. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Burniaux, Jean-Marc/Thai-Thanh Dang/Douglas Fore/Michael Forster/Marco Mira
d’Ercole/Howard Oxley, 1998: Income Distribution and Poverty in Selected OECD Coun-
tries. Economics Department Working Paper no. 189. Paris: OECD.
Calmfors, Lars/John Driffill, 1988: Bargaining Structure, Corporatism, and Macroeco-
nomic Performance. In: Economic Policy 6, 14–61.
Cameron, David R., 1984: Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence, and the
Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society. In: John H.
Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 143–178.
Cawson, Alan (ed.), 1985: Organized Interests and the State: Studies in Meso-Corporatism.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Compston, Hugh, 1997: Union Power, Policy Making, and Unemployment in Western
Europe, 1972–1993. In: Comparative Political Studies 30, 732–751.
Crepaz, Marcus M. L., 1992: Corporatism in Decline? An Empirical Analysis of the Im-
pact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic Performance and Industrial Disputes in 18 In-
dustrialized Countries. In: Comparative Political Studies 25, 139–168.
Crouch, Colin, 1985: Conditions for Trade Union Wage Restraint. In: Leon N. Lindberg/
Charles S. Maier (eds.), The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation. Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution, 105–139.
——, 1993: Industrial Relations and European State Traditions. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Ferner, Anthony/Richard Hyman (eds.), 1998: Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, 2nd
edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Flanagan, Robert J., 1999: Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An
International Perspective. In: Journal of Economic Literature 37, 1150–1175.
Franzese, Jr., Robert J., 1999: The Interaction of Credibly Conservative Monetary Policy
with Labor- and Goods-Market Institutions: A Review of an Emerging Literature. Un-
published. Department of Political Science, University of Michigan.
46 MPIfG Discussion Paper 00/4
Garrett, Geoffrey/Christopher Way, 1999: Public Sector Unions, Corporatism, and Macro-
economic Performance. In: Comparative Political Studies 32, 411–434.
Golden, Miriam/Michael Wallerstein/Peter Lange, 1997: Union Centralization among Ad-
vanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Study, version dated 11/2/98 [computer file].
Available at http:/ /www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/data.
Hall, Peter A./Robert J. Franzese, Jr., 1998: Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence,
Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union. In: International Or-
ganization 52, 505–535.
Hassel, Anke/Bernhard Ebbinghaus, 2000: Concerted Reforms: Linking Wage Formation
and Social Policy in Europe. Paper presented at the Conference of Europeanists, Chi-
cago, March-April.
Hicks, Alexander, 1999: Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Hicks, Alexander/Lane Kenworthy, 1998: Cooperation and Political Economic Perform-
ance in Affluent Democratic Capitalism. In: American Journal of Sociology 103, 1631–1672.
Hicks, Alexander/Duane Swank, 1992: Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in
Industrialized Democracies, 1960–1982. In: American Political Science Review 86, 658–674.
Huber, Evelyne/Charles Ragin/John D. Stephens, 1993: Social Democracy, Christian
Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State. In: American Journal of So-
ciology 99, 711–749.
Iversen, Torben, 1998: Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects
of Money. In: International Organization 52, 469–504.
——, 1999: Contested Economic Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Iversen, Torben/Thomas R. Cusack, 2000: The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Dein-
dustrialization or Globalization? In: World Politics 52, 313–349.
Katzenstein, Peter J., 1985: Small States in World Markets. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Keman, Hans, 1984: Politics, Policies, and Consequences: A Cross-National Analysis of
Public Policy Formation in Advanced Capitalist Democracies (1967–1981). In: European
Journal of Political Research 12, 147–170.
Kenworthy, Lane, 1995: In Search of National Economic Success: Balancing Competition and
Cooperation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
——, 1996: Unions, Wages, and the Common Interest. In: Comparative Political Studies 28,
491–524.
——, 1999: Do Social-Welfare Policies Reduce Poverty? A Cross-National Assessment. So-
cial Forces 77, 1119–1139.
——, 2000: Wage Setting Coordination Scores. Unpublished. Department of Sociology,
Emory University. Available at http:/ /www.emory.edu/SOC/lkenworthy.
Kittel, Bernhard, 1999: Sense and Sensitivity in Pooled Analysis of Political Data. In:
European Journal of Political Research 35, 225–253.
——, 2000: Trade Union Bargaining Horizons in Comparative Perspective: The Effects of
Encompassing Organization, Unemployment, and the Monetary Regime on Wage
Pushfulness. In: European Journal of Industrial Relations 6, 181–202.
Kenworthy: Quantitative Indicators of Corporatism 47
Korpi, Walter, 1985: Economic Growth and the Welfare State: Leaky Bucket or Irrigation
System? In: European Sociological Review 1, 97–118.
Layard, Richard/Stephen Nickell/Richard Jackman, 1991: Unemployment: Macroeconomic
Performance and the Labor Market. New York: Oxford University Press.
Layard, Richard/Stephen Nickell, 1994: Unemployment in the OECD Countries. In: To-
shiaki Tachibanaki (ed.), Labour Market and Economic Performance. New York: St. Mar-
tin’s Press, 253–295.
Lehmbruch, Gerhard, 1984: Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks. In:
John H. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Cla-
rendon Press, 60–80.
Lehner, Franz, 1988: The Political Economy of Distributive Conflict. In: The Future of Party
Government. Vol. 3: Managing Mixed Economies. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 54–96.
Leicht, Kevin T./J. Craig Jenkins, 1998: Political Resources and Direct State Intervention:
The Adoption of Public Venture Capital Programs in the American States, 1974–1990.
In: Social Forces 76, 1323–1345.
Lijphart, Arend/Markus M. L. Crepaz, 1991: Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in
Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages. In: British Journal of Political
Science 21, 235–256.
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), N.d.: LIS Percentile Ratios. LIS website: http:/ /www.
lis.ceps.lu/percentile.htm.
McCallum, John, 1983: Inflation and Social Consensus in the Seventies. In: Economic Jour-
nal 93, 784–805.
——, 1986: Unemployment in the OECD Countries in the 1980s. In: Economic Journal 96,
942–960.
Mitchell, Daniel J., 1980: Unions, Wages, and Inflation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-
tion.
——, 1993: Keynesian, Old Keynesian, and New Keynesian Wage Nominalism. In: Indus-
trial Relations 32, 1–29.
Nickell, Stephen, 1997: Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus
North America. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(3), 55–74.
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), 1994: OECD Jobs
Study. Paris: OECD.
, 1995: OECD Historical Statistics: 1960–1993 (diskette version). Paris: OECD.
——, 1997: Economic Performance and the Structure of Collective Bargaining. In: OECD
Employment Outlook: July 1997. Paris: OECD, 63–93.
——, 1999a: OECD Economic Outlook: December 1999. Paris: OECD.
——, 1999b: OECD Historical Statistics: 1960–1997. Paris: OECD.
——, 1999c: OECD Statistical Compendium, ed. 02#1999 [computer file]. Paris: OECD [pro-
ducer and distributor].
——, N.d.: OECD Database on Trends in Earnings Dispersion [computer file]. Paris: OECD
[producer and distributor].
Olson, Mancur, 1982: The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
48 MPIfG Discussion Paper 00/4
Paloheimo, Heikki, 1984: Distributive Struggle and Economic Development in the 1970s
in Developed Capitalist Countries. In: European Journal of Political Research 12, 171–190.
Pennings, Paul/Noel P. Vergunst, 2000: The Dynamics of Corporatist Institutions: Meas-
urements and Linkages. Unpublished. Department of Political Science and Public Ad-
ministration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Pizzorno, Alessandro, 1978: Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Con-
flict. In: Colin Crouch/Alessandro Pizzorno (eds.), The Resurgence of Class Conflict in
Western Europe since 1968. Vol. 2. London: Macmillan, 277–298.
Pochet, Philippe/Giuseppe Fajertag (eds.), 1997: Social Pacts in Europe. Brussels: Euro-
pean Trade Union Institute.
Regini, Mario, 2000: Between Deregulation and Social Pacts: The Responses of European
Economies to Globalization. In: Politics and Society 28, 5–33.
Rowthorn, Bob, 1992: Corporatism and Labour Market Performance. In: Jukka Pekkarine/
Matti Pohjola/Bob Rowthorn (eds.), Social Corporatism. New York: Oxford University
Press, 82–131.
Rubin, Beth A., 1986: Class Struggle, American Style: Unions, Strikes, and Wages. In:
American Sociological Review 51, 618–631.
Rueda, David/Jonas Pontusson, 2000: Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism. In:
World Politics 52, 350–383.
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1987 (1991): Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Schmidt, Manfred, 1982: Does Corporatism Matter? Economic Crisis, Politics, and Rates
of Unemployment in Capitalist Democracies in the 1970s. In: Gerhard Lehmbruch/
Philippe C. Schmitter (eds.), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage, 237–258.
Schmitter, Philippe C., 1974: Still the Century of Corporatism? In: Review of Politics 36, 85–
131.
——, 1981: Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western
Europe and North America. In: Suzanne D. Berger (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western
Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 285–327.
——, 1982: Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where
the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going. In: Gerhard Lehmbruch/Philippe C.
Schmitter (eds.), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. London: Sage, 259–279.
Schmitter, Philippe C./Wolfgang Streeck, 1999: The Organization of Business Interests:
Studying the Associative Action of Business in Advanced Industrial Societies. MPIfG Discus-
sion Paper 99/1. Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. Cologne: Max Planck
Institute for the Study of Societies.
Shalev, Michael, 1978: Lies, Damned Lies, and Strike Statistics: The Measurement of
Trends in Industrial Conflict. In: Colin Crouch/Alessandro Pizzorno (eds.), The Resur-
gence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968. Vol. 1. London: Macmillan, 1–19.
Siaroff, Alan, 1999: Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning and Measure-
ment. In: European Journal of Political Research 36, 175–205.
Smeeding, Timothy M., 1998: U.S. Income Inequality in a Cross-National Perspective:
Why Are We So Different? In: Richard S. Belous (ed.), The Inequality Paradox. Wash-
ington, DC: National Policy Association, 194–217.
Kenworthy: Quantitative Indicators of Corporatism 49
Smith, Michael R., 1992: Power, Norms, and Inflation. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
——, 2000: Doing Well by Doing Good? What Happened to Corporatist Countries in the
1990s, and Why? Unpublished. Department of Sociology, McGill University.
Soskice, David, 1990: Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Ad-
vanced Industrialized Countries. In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6(4), 36–61.
Stephens, John. D., 1979: The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press.
Streeck, Wolfgang/Philippe C. Schmitter, 1991: From National Corporatism to Transna-
tional Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market. In: Politics and
Society 19, 133–164.
Swank, Duane, N.d.: 18-Nation Pooled Time-Series Data Set: Strength of Political Parties
by Ideological Group in Advanced Capitalist Countries [computer file]. Available at
http:/ /www.marquette.edu/polisci/Swank.htm.
——, 2000: Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring. In: Paul Pierson (ed.),
The New Politics of the Welfare State. New York: Oxford University Press.
Swank, Duane/Cathie Jo Martin, 2000: Employers and the Welfare State: The Political
Economic Organization of Firms and Social Policy in Contemporary Capitalist Democ-
racies. Unpublished. Department of Political Science, Marquette University.
Teullings, Coen/Joop Hartog, 1998: Corporatism or Competition? Labour Contracts, Institu-
tions, and Wage Structures in International Comparison. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Therborn, Göran, 1987: Does Corporatism Really Matter? The Economic Crisis and Issues
of Political Theory. In: Journal of Public Policy 7, 259–284.
Traxler, Franz, 1996: Collective Bargaining and Industrial Change: A Case of Disorgani-
zation? A Comparative Analysis of Eighteen OECD Countries. In: European Sociological
Review 12, 271–287.
——, 1999: The State in Industrial Relations: A Cross-National Analysis of Developments
and Socioeconomic Effects. In: European Journal of Political Research 36, 55–85.
Traxler, Franz/Sabine Blaschke/Bernhard Kittel: National Labor Relations in Internation-
alized Markets. New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
Traxler, Franz/Bernhard Kittel, 2000: The Bargaining System and Performance: A Com-
parison of 18 OECD Countries. In: Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming.
United Nations (UN), various years: Demographic Yearbook. New York: UN.
Visser, Jelle, N.d.: Trade Union Membership Database [computer file]. Unpublished.
Visser, Jelle/Anton Hemerijck, 1997: “A Dutch Miracle”: Job Growth, Welfare Reform, and
Corporatism in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Wallerstein, Michael, 1999: Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced
Industrial Societies. In: American Journal of Political Science 43, 649–680.
Western, Bruce, 1997: Between Class and Market: Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist De-
mocracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wolff, Edward N., 1996: The Productivity Slowdown: The Culprit at Last? In: American
Economic Review 86, 1239–1252.
